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INTRODUCTION
Prisoners, by virtue of their incarceration, necessarily sacrificed
some of the constitutional rights and privileges that they possessed as
free citizens to ensure the effective operation of our prison system. 1 In
the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court case of Pell v.
Procunier established that “a prison inmate retains those First
Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner
or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system”
(the “Pell test”). 2 Yet, the Court left this “superficial formula” relatively
unexamined and undefined. 3 Specifically, Pell refrained from
determining if the First Amendment right to free speech remained
“inconsistent with a prison inmate’s status as a prisoner or with the

* J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., Jan. 2007, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. Thank you,
Mallory, for your enduring love and support.
1
See, e.g., Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948), abrogated by
McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (“[L]awful incarceration brings about the
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction
justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.”).
2
417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
3
See MICHAEL B. MUSLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 1.04 (2d ed. 1993) (“This
superficial formula fails to identify which constitutional rights are taken by law, but
it does make the point that important rights survive incarceration.”).
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legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” 4 Instead,
Pell and its progeny primarily evaluated whether prison restrictions on
prisoners’ asserted free speech rights possessed a reasonable relation
to the government’s legitimate penological interests. 5
Eventually, Turner v. Safley expressly confirmed the Court’s
approach to evaluating the reasonableness of prison restrictions on
prisoners’ asserted free speech rights. 6 Turner announced that “when a
prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests” (the “Turner test”). 7 Turner further established a very
deferential rational basis standard of review and a relatively welldefined four-factor approach to evaluate the relationship between the
prison’s restrictions and its legitimate penological interests. 8 Turner,
however, neglected to precisely identify the existence and scope of
protection to prisoners’ free speech rights. 9
Consequently, the Court’s neglect of the Pell test and the overall
uncertain status of prisoners’ free speech rights presented considerable
difficulties for the Seventh Circuit when it evaluated prisoners’ free
speech retaliation claims. 10 Because the Court never determined if the
First Amendment protected prisoners’ free speech from retaliation or
the proper constitutional standard for evaluating prisoners’ free speech
retaliation claims, 11 the Seventh Circuit found itself applying the
Court’s well-known and well-defined test for evaluating public
employees’ free speech retaliation claims to the prison setting. 12
4

See discussion infra Part I.A and note 52 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part I.A and note 61 and accompanying text.
6
482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see discussion infra Part I.B.
7
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
8
See id. at 89–93; discussion infra Parts I.B.
9
See discussion infra Parts I.B–C.
10
See discussion infra Part IV.A., IV.C, V.B.
11
See Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 549 (7th Cir. 2009) (observing that the
Court’s prisoner free speech jurisprudence refrained from explicitly mandating, or
excluding, the legitimate penological interests test for evaluating prisoners’ free
speech retaliation claims).
12
See, e.g., Brookins v. Kolb, 990 F.2d 308, 313(7th Cir. 1992), abrogated in
part by Bridges, 557 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2009); Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732,
5
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In the Court’s public employee free speech jurisprudence, the
First Amendment protected a public employee’s speech against
retaliation only if the public employee (1) “spoke as a citizen on a
matter of public concern” (the “public concern test”); 13 and (2) the
government-employer possessed no “adequate justification for treating
the employee differently from any other member of the general
public” (the “Pickering balancing test”). 14 Hence, the Seventh Circuit
supported the notion that the First Amendment protected a prisoner’s
speech against retaliation if the prisoner—like the public employee—
spoke “on a matter of public concern” and the government-as-jailor
possessed no legitimate interest in restricting the prisoner’s speech.
Aside from the fact that the Court’s precedent arguably left open
what tests should apply to evaluate prisoners’ free speech retaliation
claims, the Seventh Circuit’s application of the public concern and
Pickering balancing tests to the prison context made some sense for
three primary reasons. 15 First, unlike the uncertain and confusing
status of prisoners’ free speech rights, the Court specifically
articulated a precise and well-defined test to evaluate free speech
retaliation claims in the public employment context. 16 Second, if the
First Amendment restricted public employees’ free speech retaliation
claims by a public concern test, then the First Amendment surely
similarly restricted prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims unless
courts reached the absurd result of potentially granting prisoners
741–42 (7th Cir. 2006); McElroy v. Force, 403 F.3d 855, 858–59 (7th Cir. 2005)
(per curiam); Sasnett v. Litscher, 197 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 1999), abrogated in
part by Bridges, 557 F.3d 541.
13
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
14
Id.
15
See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 549–50 (observing that the Court’s public employee
free speech jurisprudence neither expressly limited the public concern test to public
employees’ free speech retaliation claims, nor definitely indicated that the test
should apply to other free speech retaliation claims); supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
16
See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding it
helpful to draw upon the public employee free speech jurisprudence to analyze other
free speech retaliation claims because the bulk of First Amendment retaliation claims
arose in the public employee setting); discussion infra Part I.
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greater free speech rights than public employees. 17 Third, the free
speech rights of prisoners and public employees remained similarly
situated in that both received less constitutional protection than normal
citizens because the government’s unique interests in controlling both
populations to effectively provide government services necessarily
required both groups to accept certain limitations on their freedom of
speech. 18
The Seventh Circuit, however, reconsidered its support for
applying the public concern and Pickering balancing tests to prisoners’
free speech retaliation claims in Bridges v. Gilbert. 19 The prisonerclaimant, Jimmy Bridges, alleged that prison officials retaliated
against him for providing an affidavit in a lawsuit brought by the
estate of another inmate. 20 In that prior lawsuit, Bridges averred his
account of an incident involving prison officials’ alleged mistreatment
of the other inmate while that inmate was gravely ill and later died. 21
The trial court dismissed Bridges’s complaint because his speech did
not involve a matter of public concern since it only involved a matter
personal to the estate of the other inmate. 22 On appeal, Bridges urged
the Seventh Circuit to reject its support of a public concern test for
prisoners’ free speech retaliation claim in favor of the Turner test. 23
17

See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 388 (commenting that the public concern
requirement may be applicable to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims because
“[p]risoners certainly do not have greater free speech rights than public
employees.”).
18
Compare supra note 1 and accompanying text, with Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418
(“When a citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept
certain limitations on his or her freedom.”). See generally Scott A. Moss, Students
and Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My! A Cautionary Note About Excessive
Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 U.C.L.A L. REV 1635
(2007) (observing that the low level of scrutiny the Court applied to prisoners’ and
public employees’ free speech claims contrasted with the strict scrutiny standard the
Court typically applied to government restrictions on free speech).
19
See 557 F.3d at 546–52.
20
Id. at 544.
21
Id. at 544, 551.
22
Bridges v. Huibregtse, No. 06-C-544-S, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2477, at *4
(W.D. Wis. Jan. 8, 2007).
23
Bridges, 557 F.3d at 547.
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Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit agreed with Bridges and held that
“a prisoner’s speech can be protected even when it does not involve a
matter of public concern.” 24 Instead, the Seventh Circuit purportedly
adopted the Turner test to evaluate prisoners’ free speech retaliation
claims. 25 In reality, however, the Seventh Circuit analyzed Bridges’s
free speech retaliation claim under the Pell test when it held that
Bridges’s allegedly truthful speech about possible prison abuses was
“not inconsistent with legitimate penological objectives” without
applying the Turner test, its factors, standard of review, or explicit
reference to the deference courts typically reserve for the judgment of
prison officials. 26 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit’s attempt to
clarify the constitutional level of protection for prisoners’ free speech
retaliation claims only left the ambiguous status of prisoners’ free
speech rights as uncertain as ever. 27
This article analyzes and evaluates the Seventh Circuit’s opinion
in Bridges v. Gilbert. Part I reviews the Court’s relevant First
Amendment jurisprudence concerning prisoners’ free speech rights,
while Part II examines the Court’s public employee free speech
jurisprudence. Part III analyzes other federal circuits’ approaches to
prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims, while Part IV discusses the
Seventh Circuit’s approach to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims.
Lastly, Part V evaluates the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bridges. Part
V argues that the Seventh Circuit’s purported adoption of the Turner
test plausibly conformed to Court precedent, but that Bridges
effectively, and incorrectly, applied the Pell test to the prisoner’s free
speech claim. Finally, Part V contends that the Seventh Circuit should
have considered applying the public concern and Pickering balancing
tests to adjudicate a prisoner’s speech on a matter of publicpenological concern against the government’s legitimate penological
interests in restricting the prisoner’s speech. This approach proves
more workable than the legitimate penological interests tests, protects

24

Id. at 551.
Id. at 551–52.
26
See id.; discussion infra Parts IV.C, V.B.
27
See discussion infra Parts IV.C, V.B–C.
25
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important free speech rights, and ensures that prisoners do not possess
potentially broader free speech rights than public employees.
I. THE COURT’S PRISONER FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
Whether prisoners even enjoyed the protection of the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment, 28 the “Constitution’s most majestic
guarantee,” 29 remained in doubt for nearly 170 years. 30 Since
American prisons first developed in the early nineteenth century after
the conception of the Constitution, 31 courts initially applied the Bill of
Rights only as “a declaration of general principles to govern a society
of freemen, and not of convicted felons and men civilly dead.” 32 One
court famously treated convicted felons as “slaves of the State,” who
possessed only those “personal rights . . . the law in its humanity
accords . . . .” 33 Also, because the early prototypical prison institutions
strictly prohibited inmates from talking, engaging in communications
with other prisoners, and receiving publications except for the Bible,
considerable doubt remained over whether prisoners retained their free
speech rights. 34
Early twentieth century prison reform movements relaxed these
silence requirements and other prisoner speech restrictions due to
then-prevailing beliefs that the harshness of prison life promoted
recidivism by hardening prisoners to a criminal way of life. 35 Yet, by
the mid-twentieth century, society generally considered prisons’
rehabilitative efforts futile. 36 Consequently, prisons primarily became

28

The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment states, “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
29
LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1 (2d ed.
1988).
30
MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 1.02.
31
Id. § 1.01.
32
Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt. 790, 796 (Va. 1871).
33
Id.
34
MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 1.01.
35
Id.
36
Id.
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warehouses for society’s criminals with little regard for prisoners’ free
speech rights or other conditions of confinement. 37
Furthermore, since courts deliberately refrained from questioning
what constitutional rights survived incarceration as part of the socalled hands-off doctrine, the law perpetuated the ambiguous status of
prisoners’ free speech rights. 38 Courts supported the hands-off
doctrine because they believed judicial intervention into internal
prison affairs implicated concerns about the separation of powers, 39
federalism, 40 institutional expertise, 41 and the unstated potential for
boundless—and possibly meritless—litigation. 42
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ended the hands-off doctrine and
permitted courts to adjudicate prisoners’ free speech claims against
prison officials. 43 Thus, the Court developed its prisoner free speech
jurisprudence in cases like Pell v. Procunier 44 and Turner v. Safley. 45
These cases established the possible tests for evaluating prisoners’ free
speech retaliation claims, but they provided little definition or
protection to prisoners’ free speech rights. 46 As a result, the hands-off
doctrine’s legacy on the uncertain status of prisoners’ free speech
rights remained ever-present in the Court’s prisoner free speech
37

Id.
Id. § 1.02.
39
Id. (commenting that concerns about the separation of powers existed
because courts generally viewed the management and control of prisons as executive
and legislative functions).
40
Id. (commenting that considerations about federalism arose because many
prisoner suits were brought in federal courts by state inmates, and federal courts did
not want to tell states how to run their prisons).
41
Id. (commenting that concerns about institutional expertise developed
because courts believed that the management of prisons required considerable
training, skill, and experience that only corrections officials possessed).
42
Id. (commenting that concerns about litigation developed because of the
large volume of idle prisoners).
43
Id. § 1.03; see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405–06 (1974)
(“When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional
guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.”).
44
417 U.S. 817 (1974).
45
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
46
See discussion infra Part I.A–C.
38
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jurisprudence. 47 Accordingly, Part I reviews Pell v. Procunier, Turner
v. Safley, and the differences between the Pell and Turner tests.
A. Pell v. Procunier
Pell upheld a prison regulation prohibiting face-to-face
communications between prison inmates and members of the press. 48
In analyzing the prisoners’ free speech claims, 49 the Court initially
noted that lawful incarceration necessarily restricted the rights and
privileges of prisoners. 50 As a corollary to that principle, the Pell
Court announced its test that “a prison inmate retains those First
Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a
prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the
corrections system.” 51 The Pell Court, however, did not consider the
existence of prisoners’ free speech rights to communicate with the
journalists survived their imprisonment. 52 Instead, the Pell Court
assumed that the prisoners possessed a free speech right to
communicate with the journalists, and proceeded to evaluate the
reasonableness of the prison regulation in light of the prison’s
legitimate penological objectives.53
Next, the Pell Court identified three generally legitimate
penological interests: (1) the deterrence of crime; (2) the rehabilitation
of prisoners; and (3) the maintenance of internal security
47

See MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 1.04.
Pell, 417 U.S. at 827–28, 835. This comment does not analyze the press
officials’ more famous First Amendment challenge.
49
The Pell prisoners asserted a free speech right to communicate their views to
any willing listener, which included a willing representative of the press for the
purpose of publication by a willing publisher. Id. at 822. The Court assumed that the
Free Speech Clause protected such a right. Id.
50
Id. (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).
51
Id.
52
Id.; see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (commenting that
Pell refrained from deciding whether the asserted First Amendment right survived
incarceration because the prison regulation was a reasonable exercise of the prison
officials’ judgment as to the appropriate means of furthering penological goals).
53
Pell, 417 U.S. at 822.
48
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considerations within the prison institutions. 54 Then, the Court upheld
the prison restrictions because they furthered these legitimate
penological objectives. 55 First, the Court determined that the
restrictions deterred crime because isolating prisoners in presumably
undesirable conditions reasonably deterred prisoners and others from
committing additional criminal offenses. 56 Second, the restrictions
furthered prisoners’ rehabilitation and maintained prison security
because the corrections officers believed that the restrictions allowed
the inmates to have personal contact with people who aided their
rehabilitation while not compromising the security concerns inherent
in face-to-face communications. 57 Thus, in evaluating whether the
prison restrictions served the legitimate penological objectives, Pell
deferred to the “expert judgment” of the corrections officers absent
“substantial evidence in the record to indicate . . . the officials . . .
exaggerated their response to [the legitimate penological]
considerations.” 58 Pell also considered the regulation as a reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction because it was content-neutral and
allowed prisoners alternative means of communicating with
outsiders. 59
Ultimately, the Pell Court’s failure to apply the Pell test left
future courts without any definition or explanation of what free speech
rights, if any, actually survived incarceration. 60 Instead, the Court
generally adopted Pell’s approach to solely evaluate the validity of
54

Id.
Id. at 827–28.
56
Id. at 822. The Court’s reasoning under the legitimate penological interest of
deterring crime placed no real limiting principle on the types of permissible prison
restrictions because any restriction on prisoners’ free speech rights would make
conditions less desirable and thereby deter crime. See id.; cf. also Beard v. Banks,
548 U.S. 541, 546 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the deprivation
theory of rehabilitation possessed no limiting principle because any deprivation of a
prisoner’s constitutional right provided the prisoner an incentive to improve his or
her behavior and the theoretical opportunity to have the right restored with improved
behavior). However, no case since Pell disavowed this reasoning.
57
Pell, 417 U.S. at 822, 827.
58
Id. at 827.
59
Id. at 823–27.
60
See id. at 822; supra note 3 and accompanying text.
55
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contested prison regulations on prisoners’ asserted First Amendment
right under a very deferential, rational basis standard of review. 61 The
Court formally adopted this approach in Turner v. Safley. 62
B. Turner v. Safley
In a 5–4 decision written by Justice O’Connor, Turner upheld a
prison regulation prohibiting correspondence between inmates in the
prison system unless the correspondence was between immediate
family members or concerned legal matters, but invalidated a prison
regulation that essentially prohibited inmates from marrying anyone. 63
Turner expressly resolved the constitutional standard of review for
evaluating the validity of prison regulations that infringed upon the
free speech rights of prisoners. 64 Specifically, Turner rejected
evaluating contested prison regulations under a heightened or
intermediate level of scrutiny. 65 Instead, Turner announced a rational
basis standard of review and its test by declaring that “when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is
valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”66
Additionally, Turner established four relevant factors that courts
should consider when evaluating the reasonableness of the contested
61

See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (observing that the
Court generally adopted Pell’s refusal to consider if the prisoner’s asserted right
survived incarceration, and instead evaluated the reasonableness of the prison
restrictions on the asserted right).
62
See discussion infra Part I.B.
63
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987).
64
Id. at 86, 89. Turner also announced the constitutional standard for
evaluating a regulation that restricted prisoners’ due process right to marry. Id. at 89.
65
Id. In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) abrogated in part by
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989), the Court applied an
intermediate level of scrutiny to invalidate a prison regulation that restricted the free
speech rights of non-inmates based solely on the First Amendment rights of the nonprison population. Thornburgh applied Turner’s rational basis review to prisoners’
incoming communications even from non-prisoners, but left undecided the standard
of review for restrictions on prisoners’ outgoing communications to non-prisoners.
490 U.S. at 413–14.
66
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
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prison regulation. 67 “First, there must be a ‘valid, rational connection’
between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest
put forward to justify it.” 68 Framed differently, the rational or logical
connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate, contentneutral, penological interest cannot remain “so remote as to render the
policy arbitrary or irrational.” 69 Second, Turner considered the
existence of “alternative means of exercising the right that remain
open to prison inmates.” 70 Third, Turner analyzed “the impact
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards
and other inmates and on the allocation of prison resources
generally.” 71 Fourth, Turner stated that “the absence of ready
alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation.” 72
In Turner, the correspondence restriction was supported by each
of the factors, according to the Court’s rational basis review. 73 First,
the correspondence regulation was logically connected to the prison’s
valid security concerns because the prison officials claimed that they
implemented the regulation to control communications about escape,
assault, violence, and gang-related plans. 74 Second, the
correspondence regulation allowed inmates alternative means of
expression because it only barred communication between “a limited
class of other people.” 75 Third, since the Turner prison officials
testified that accommodating the prisoners’ correspondence rights
entailed significant security risks to guards and inmates, the Court
deferred to the prison officials’ expert judgment in enacting the prison

67

Id.
Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
69
Id. at 89–90.
70
Id. at 90.
71
Id. at 92–93.
72
Id. at 90. Under this factor, the inmate possessed the burden of proving the
contested regulation was an “exaggerated response” to prison concerns, which the
inmate could accomplish by pointing to an “alternative that fully accommodates the
prisoner’s rights at a de minimis cost to valid penological interests.” Id. at 90–91.
73
Id. at 91–93.
74
Id. at 91–92.
75
Id. at 92.
68
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regulation. 76 Fourth, the proposed alternative of having the prison
officials monitor and screen the correspondence imposed more than a
de minimis cost due to the administrative difficulties and risk of error
in missing dangerous messages. 77
Turner’s test and its analysis definitively established a rational
basis standard of review for evaluating prisoners’ free speech claims. 78
The Turner Court granted prisoners’ free speech claims the lowest
level of First Amendment protection to advance the Court’s policy of
judicial restraint in prison affairs. 79 The Court, motivated by the sameold concerns about the separation of powers, 80 institutional
expertise, 81 and federalism, 82 decided that rational basis review
appropriately afforded substantial deference to the expert judgment of
prison officials. 83 Rational basis review not only allowed courts to
refrain from the awkward position of second-guessing prison officials,
but it also provided prison officials with confidence that they would
not have to second-guess “their ability to anticipate security problems
and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison
administration.” 84 Consequently, some commentators argued that
Turner’s rational basis review marked a return to the thoroughly

76

Id.
Id. at 93.
78
Id. at 89.
79
Id. at 85.
80
Id. at 84–85 (“Prison administration is . . . a task that has been committed to
the responsibility of [the legislative and executive] branches, and separation of
powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint.”).
81
Id. (“Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires
expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources.”). Additionally, the Court
commented that “‘courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent
problems of prison administration and reform.’ . . . ‘[T]he problems of prisons in
America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily
susceptible of resolution by decree.’” Id. at 84 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 404–5 (1974)).
82
Id. at 85 (“Where a state penal system is involved, federal courts have . . .
additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.”).
83
Id. at 89.
84
Id.
77
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discredited hands-off doctrine. 85 At the least, rational basis review
ensured that courts recognized and protected fewer prisoners’ free
speech rights. 86
Moreover, while Turner neglected to consider if prisoners
retained a constitutional right to free speech under the Pell test, 87 the
Turner Court applied the Pell test to expressly hold that prisoners’
right to marry was not inconsistent with the prisoners’ status or the
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. 88 In
applying the Pell test, the Turner Court reasoned that the right to
marry survived incarceration because many of the incidents of
marriage remained “unaffected by the fact of confinement or the
pursuit of legitimate corrections goals.” 89 Some of the incidents of
marriage that survived incarceration included personal expressions of
emotional support, public commitment, and religious faith. 90 The
Turner Court, however, made no mention of a rational basis standard
of review, the appropriate level of deference to apply to prison
officials’ contrary contentions, or the Turner factors when it
considered whether the prisoners’ right to marry was inconsistent with
85

See MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 1.04 (citing Cheryl Dunn Giles, Turner v. Safley
and Its Progeny: A Gradual Retreat to the “Hands-Off” Doctrine?, 35 ARIZ. L. REV.
219 (1993)).
86
Id.
87
See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84. The Court expressly noted that prisoners retained
at least three constitutional rights: First, the right to petition the government for the
redress of grievances under Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); second, the right
to protection against invidious racial discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause under Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); and third, the right
to the protections of due process under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
The Court, however, never mentioned that prisoners retained their free speech rights.
See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84.
88
Id. at 95 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 822).
89
Id. at 96.
90
Turner found four incidents of marriage survived incarceration. Id. at 95–96.
First, inmate marriages, like other marriages, were personal expressions of emotional
support and public commitment. Id. Second, inmate marriages may also be
expressions of religious faith. Id. at 96. Third, inmates may marry with the
expectation of later consummating their marriage once they were eventually
released. Id. Fourth, marital status conferred the receipt of certain important
government benefits. Id.
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legitimate penological objectives.91 At the same time, however, the
Turner Court also appeared to support a total prohibition on the right
to marry if the prohibition formed part of the punishment for the
prisoner’s crime. 92 Thus, the Court’s analysis of what constitutional
rights survived incarceration remained unclear. 93
Finally, after the Turner Court used the Pell test to hold that
prisoners retained the right to marry, the Court applied the Turner test
to invalidate the prison’s marriage restrictions under its rational basis
review. 94 Unlike the Court’s application of the Turner test to the
correspondence restrictions, the Court seemed less willing to defer to
the prison officials’ judgments about the rational relationship between
the marriage restrictions and the prison’s legitimate penological
objectives. 95 First, the Court held that the marriage restrictions
possessed no reasonable relation to the prison officials’ asserted
interests in preventing the security threat from “love triangles” and
promoting the rehabilitation of female convicts entangled in
excessively dependent relationships with dangerous men. 96 Second,
the Court did not expressly consider the reasonableness of the
91

See id. at 95–96.
See id. at 96 (distinguishing Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974),
summarily aff’g Johnson v. Rockefeller, 365 F. Supp. 377 (S.D. N.Y. 1974)).
Currently, only Justices Thomas and Scalia expressly support this view. See, e.g.,
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 139–41 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(evaluating prisoners’ challenges to deprivations of their asserted rights solely under
the Eighth Amendment).
93
See James E. Robertson, The Rehnquist Court and the “Turnerization” of
Prisoners’ Rights, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV 97, 107 (2006) (discussing the Court’s lack
of clarity in what rights survive incarceration).
94
Id. at 97–99.
95
See id. at 91–93, 97–99.
96
Id. at 98–99. Regarding the security justification, the Court held that the
marriage restriction was too broad because “love triangles” could exist independent
of marriage relationships. Id. at 98. For the rehabilitation interest, the Court similarly
held that the marriage restriction was too broad because it encompassed inmatecivilian marriages and male inmate marriages. Id. at 99. Obviously, the
correspondence regulation was too broad in that it blocked non-dangerous
communications; however, the Court still found the ban “logically connected” to the
prison’s legitimate security concerns. See id. at 91–92.
92
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marriage restriction under Turner’s second factor, but the restriction
necessarily left inmates with some alternative means of exercising
their right to marry by not completely prohibiting inmate marriages. 97
Lastly, the Court found the third and fourth factors showed that the
marriage restriction possessed no reasonable relation to the prison’s
legitimate interests largely because the Court reasoned that
accommodating non-dangerous marriages posed no security risks. 98
Thus, Turner itself demonstrated the important differences and
consequences between the Pell and Turner tests. Part C discusses
these differences in greater detail.
C. The Differences Between the Pell and Turner Tests Produced
Important Consequences for Prisoners’ Free Speech Rights
The Pell and Turner tests asked different questions, contained
markedly different analysis, and produced different consequences with
respect to protecting prisoners’ rights. 99 While the Turner test
possessed a relatively well-defined framework of analysis and
standard of review that compelled courts to substantially defer to
prison officials’ determinations about the reasonableness of restricting
prisoners’ rights, the Pell test lacked definition, a specific standard of
review, and further allowed courts to make their own determinations
of proper prison administration. 100 Consequently, the Turner test
97

See id. at 99. Since the Court claimed the marriage restriction formed an
“almost complete ban on the decision to marry,” it apparently left some alternative
means of exercising the right and should have passed under this second factor. See
id. at 92, 99.
98
Id. at 97–98. Under the third factor, because the Court determined the
marriage decision was a completely private decision that did not reasonably impact
the prison’s security concerns, the impact of accommodating the right to marry failed
to trigger a significant “ripple effect” on other inmates and prison officials. Id. at 98.
Under the fourth factor, the marriage regulation had an easy alternative to
accommodate the right to marry at a de minimus cost because inmates could marry
unless the warden specifically determined the marriage presented a security risk. Id.
at 97–98.
99
See discussion supra Part I.B; discussion infra Parts I.C, III.B–C, V.B.
100
See discussion supra Part I.B; discussion infra Parts I.C, III.B–C, V.B.
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recognized few prisoners’ rights, but the Pell test is vague—it may
recognize many prisoners’ rights or no rights whatsoever.101
Essentially, the Pell test determined if prisoners possessed a given
First Amendment right, while the Turner test evaluated the
reasonableness of restricting that given right. 102 In the prisoner free
speech retaliation claim context, courts applying the Pell test should
ask if the prisoner’s right to exercise free speech without government
retaliation remained “not inconsistent with [the prisoner’s] status as a
prisoner or the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system.” 103 In contrast, courts applying the Turner test to a prisoner’s
free speech retaliation claim should ask if the prison’s allegedly
retaliatory actions were “reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.” 104
Accordingly, the Pell test largely operated as a threshold to the
Turner test. 105 If a prisoner’s free speech retaliation claim failed to
pass the Pell test, then courts need not question the reasonableness of
restricting the prisoner’s speech under the Turner test because the
prisoner possessed no actual right to a free speech retaliation claim,
and judicial deference to prison officials should be nearly absolute. 106
But, if the prisoner’s asserted free speech right passed the Pell test and
survived imprisonment, then courts could still apply the Turner test to
determine the reasonableness of restricting the prisoner’s speech. 107 Of
course, if the court’s Pell inquiry determined that prisoners possessed
101

See discussion supra Part I.B; discussion infra Parts I.C, III.B–C, V.B.
See discussion supra Part I.A–B.
103
See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); discussion supra Part I.A.
104
See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; discussion supra Part I.B.
105
See, e.g., Pell, 417 U.S. at 822; Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510
(2006) (finding under the Pell test that prisoners retained their Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection right against invidious racial discrimination, and
remanding to evaluate the prisoner’s claim under strict scrutiny review rather than
Turner’s rational basis review).
106
See, e.g., Pell, 417 U.S. at 822; Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015,
1033 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that when the prisoner’s asserted right was found not to
exist in the prison context because it was inherently inconsistent with legitimate
penological objectives, there could not be any actual invasion of the purported right,
and judicial deference to prison officials should be nearly absolute).
107
See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. at 95–99.
102
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a protected right to speak freely without retaliation, then the court
would perhaps be more willing to protect that right against
governmental restrictions—as demonstrated by Turner. 108
The standard of review and level of deference courts respectively
applied to prisoners’ free speech claims and prison officials’
contentions about prison administration marked one critical distinction
between the Pell and Turner tests. The Turner test specifically formed
a definite framework, with a four-factor test and rational basis
standard of review. 109 In fact, Turner’s factors and its analysis
explicitly instructed courts to defer to the prison officials’
considerations of whether the prison’s actions reasonably related to the
prison’s legitimate interests. 110 Conversely, the Court failed to develop
a definite framework or standard of review when it applied the Pell
test. 111 By itself, the Pell test remained an indeterminate and
“superficial formula” that failed to identify what constitutional rights
survived incarceration. 112 Consequently, courts applying just the Pell
test tended to make their own judgments about proper prison
administration. 113
For instance, in Johnson v. California, 114 the Court recently
applied just the Pell test to hold that prisoners retained their
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection right against invidious racial
discrimination. 115 In so holding, the Court rejected evaluating the
108

See id. (applying the Pell test to find that prisoners retained the right to
marry and further invalidating the marriage restrictions under the Turner test, but
applying the Turner test to uphold the correspondence restrictions); supra notes 96–
98 and accompanying text.
109
See discussion supra Part I.B.
110
See discussion supra Part I.B.
111
See discussion supra Parts I.A–B.
112
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
113
See discussion supra Part I.B; discussion infra Parts I.C., III.B–C, IV.C,
V.B.
114
543 U.S. 499 (2005).
115
Id. at 510–11. Johnson also asserted in dicta the less controversial claim that
a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment
survived incarceration. Id. Whether rights other than those considered in Johnson
survived incarceration remains undetermined, but recent evidence suggested courts
confined Johnson’s reasoning to racial discrimination and Eighth Amendment
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prison’s unwritten policy of initially segregating prisoners’ cell mates
by race under Turner’s rational basis review, and remanded the case to
review the prison’s policy under strict scrutiny like all government
racial classifications. 116 The Johnson Court held that prisoners
retained their Equal Protection Clause right against racial
discrimination because such a right need not “necessarily be
compromised for the sake of proper prison administration . . . . [since]
the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination is not only
consistent with proper prison administration, but also bolsters the
legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system.” 117 The Johnson
Court’s reasoning cited precedent concerning the Fourteenth
Amendment and the criminal justice system; but, like Turner’s
application of the Pell test to the right to marry, Johnson made no
mention of the standard of review or the level of deference courts
should apply to the prison officials’ contrary contentions. 118
In dissent, Justice Thomas harshly criticized the Court’s use of the
Pell test. 119 Justice Thomas argued that the majority ignored precedent
and wise policy by making its own ill-considered judgment about
proper prison administration, instead of expressly deferring to the
expert judgment of prison officials. 120 According to Justice Thomas,
the Pell test necessarily required courts to make their own judgments
about proper prison administration because, “[f]or a court to know
whether any particular right is inconsistent with proper prison
administration, it must have some implicit notion of what a proper

claims. See Robertson, supra note 93, at 108 (analyzing recent prisoner rights cases).
This comment, however, contends that the federal circuits applied Johnson’s
reasoning to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims. See discussion supra Parts
III.B–C; IV.C, V.B.
116
Id. at 515.
117
Id. at 510–11.
118
Id. (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986)); see also Robertson, supra note 93, at 107 (discussing
Johnson’s failure to further elaborate or identify why rights remained fundamentally
inconsistent with incarceration); discussion supra Part I.B.
119
Johnson, 543 U.S. at 541–42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
120
Id.
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prison ought to look like and how it ought to be administered.” 121 Yet,
Justice Thomas argued that the Court specifically developed and
routinely applied the Turner test because precedent and wise policy
dictated that courts should not make judgments about proper prison
administration. 122 Thus, Justice Thomas believed that the Pell test
remained irreparably inconsistent with the Court’s precedent and
policy of deference to prison officials. 123
The other critical difference between the Pell and Turner tests
concerned how they evaluated the prisoners’ asserted rights. Both tests
“refused to recognize any hierarchy of values among important
constitutionally protected interests” 124 and balance the prisoners’
rights against the government’s legitimate penological interests by
always elevating any penological concern to “a higher constitutional
plane than [the asserted constitutional] rights.” 125 In Shaw v. Murphy,
the Court specifically rejected a prison inmate’s attempt to enhance the
First Amendment protection of his speech about important legal
121

Id.
Id.
123
See id. Justice Thomas advocated an approach examining the history of
incarceration to determine if prisoners forfeited their asserted rights as a condition of
their punishment. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 141–45 (2003)
(Thomas, J., concurring). This approach, however, remained just as indeterminate as
the Pell test because the history of incarceration constantly evolved to restrict or
accommodate prisoners’ free speech rights depending on then-prevailing beliefs
about whether such measures best achieved legitimate penological objectives. See
discussion supra Part I.
124
MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 1.04; Robertson, supra note 93, at 119–20
(“[Turner’s] first [factor] functions as the leveler of rights by drawing no distinction
between “weak” (non-fundamental) and “strong” (fundamental) rights.”).
125
Robertson, supra note 93, at 119–20 (“[Turner’s] first [factor’s]
commitment to rationality, the sine qua non of the test, has a clear subtext:
Reasonable means of achieving goals, including petty goals, trump rights. Indeed,
penal goals acquire the status of categorical imperatives.”). Robertson further
described the Turner test as “faux-balancing” because the Turner test “deceptively
suggests balancing,” but the first factor controlled the outcome of the remaining
factors and was generally contrived “to foreordain a finding against the prisoner’s
constitutional claim.” Id. (quoting Lynn S. Branham, “Go and Sin No More”: The
Constitutionality of Governmentally Funded Faith-Based Prison Units, 37 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 291, 297 (2004)).
122
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matters—or balance the value of the prisoner’s speech against the
prison’s legitimate interests—because such approaches contravened
the Turner test’s singular concern with the rational relationship
between the prison’s actions and its legitimate objectives. 126 Similarly,
the Pell test, by definition, refrained from assigning any weight or
value to the prisoner’s asserted free speech rights beyond those rights’
mere consistency to the prison’s legitimate penological interests. 127
Yet, although the Turner test deliberately ignored the identity, nature,
or existence of prisoners’ asserted rights by solely focusing on the
rational relationship between the prison’s actions and its legitimate
penological interests, the Pell test necessarily required courts to
consider the identity, nature, and existence of prisoners’ asserted free
speech rights to determine whether they remained consistent with
incarceration. 128
For instance, when the Turner Court applied just the Turner test
to the prisoner’s free speech claim, the Court assumed that the prisoner
retained a First Amendment right to correspond with other inmates
without any further discussion or analysis of why prisoners retained
such free speech rights. 129 Conversely, when the Turner Court applied
the Pell test to the prisoner’s right to marry claim, the Court
exhaustively considered the identity, nature, and incidents of the right
to marry and whether such incidents remained applicable in the prison
setting. 130 Since the Turner test refused to question the identity or
quality of prisoners’ free speech rights, the Turner test had the effect
of ignoring prisoners’ free speech rights with the consequence of
126

See, e.g., Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229–30 (2001). In Shaw, the
prisoner contested prison rules that prevented him, as a high-security inmate, from
offering legal assistance to a minimum-security prisoner. Id. at 225 n. 1. Since the
prison rules possessed a reasonable relation to the prison’s legitimate security
interests, the Court upheld the rules. Id. at 229–30. The Court expressly rejected an
attempt to balance the importance of the prisoner’s right, or the value of the content
of the prisoner’s speech, against the importance of the penological interests served
by the prison rule. Id. at 229 n.2.
127
See MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 1.04.
128
See discussion supra Parts I.A–C; discussion infra Parts III.B–C, IV.C.
129
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 89 (1987).
130
Id. at 95–96; supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
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recognizing fewer prisoner free speech rights in practice. 131
Contrarily, when the Turner Court had to consider the nature and
actual existence of the prisoner’s asserted right under the Pell test, the
Court felt more inclined to protect that right against the prison’s
restrictions. 132
Interestingly, the Court’s applications of the Pell test suggested
that prisoners should retain their free speech rights. 133 Undoubtedly,
prisoners’ free speech rights encompassed the same personal
expressions of emotional support, public commitment, and religious
faith that survived incarceration as incidents of marriage. 134 In fact,
prisoner speech helped inform the public about how the government
operated prisons, 135 checked government abuses of power by prison
officials, 136 contributed to the “marketplace of ideas,” 137 reduced
recidivism, 138 and further enabled the political participation of
“discrete and insular minorities.” 139 Not surprisingly, then, courts
consistently applied the Pell test to find that many of the incidents of
free speech remained consistent with incarceration. 140 Yet, courts
applying the Pell test could just as easily conclude that prisoners’ free
speech rights remained inconsistent with incarceration, making the
application of the Pell test to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims a
pyrrhic victory for prisoners. 141
Ultimately, the differences between the Pell and Turner tests
produced markedly divergent consequences with respect to protecting
131

See MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 1.04; discussion supra Part I.B–C.
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
133
See discussion supra Parts I.B–C.
134
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
135
See MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 5.00.
136
See id.
137
See id.
138
See Jessica Feierman, Creative Prison Lawyering: From Silence to
Democracy, 11 GEO J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 249, 250 n.7 (2004).
139
See id. at 249, 269, 271 (arguing that prisoners as a class consisted of a
discrete and insular minority and individual prisoners typically belonged to discrete
and insular minorities); MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 1.03 n.43 (citing United States v.
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
140
See discussion supra Parts III.B–C, IV.C.
141
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
132
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prisoners’ rights or deferring to prison officials. While the Turner test
may defer too much to prison officials’ judgments about prisoners’
rights, the indeterminacy of the Pell test may produce a similarly
extreme deference or the unfortunate consequence of unduly impeding
prison officials in performing their legitimate and necessary public
services. Before discussing how the federal circuits’ approaches to
prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims further demonstrated the
important differences between the Pell and Turner tests, this comment
analyzes the Court’s approach to evaluating free speech retaliation
claims in the highly restrictive context of public employment.
II. THE COURT’S PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
Unlike the Court’s prisoner free speech jurisprudence, the Court
clearly established the test for analyzing public employees’ free
speech retaliation claims in the cases Pickering v. Board of Education
of Township High School District 205, 142 Connick v. Meyers, 143 and
Garcetti v. Ceballos. 144 These cases formed a two-step approach for
evaluating public employees’ free speech retaliation claims: First, the
public employee must “speak as a citizen on a matter of public
concern” (the “public concern test”); and second, the public
employee’s free speech interests must outweigh the government’s
interest—as an employer—in restricting the speech to effectively
provide public services (the “Pickering balancing test”). 145 If the
public employee failed to speak as a citizen on a matter of public
concern, then the employee possessed no free speech retaliation claim,
and courts dismissed the claim without even engaging in the Pickering
balancing test. 146 Although this two-step approach provided public
employees with less constitutional protection for their free speech
rights than normal citizens, the tests critically identified and preserved
important free speech rights while not unduly interfering with essential
142

391 U.S. 563 (1968).
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
144
547 U.S. 410 (2006).
145
See, e.g., id. at 418.
146
See id.
143
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government interests by performing its categorical public concern and
ad hoc Pickering balancing tests. 147 Thus, this comment briefly
reviews the Court’s public employee free speech jurisprudence.
A. Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School
District 205
Pickering held that a public school teacher’s dismissal for sending
a letter to a local newspaper that criticized the way the school board
and district superintendent handled past revenue raising proposals
violated the teacher’s First Amendment right to free speech. 148
Pickering unequivocally rejected the old dogma that public employees
waived their constitutional rights as citizens to comment on matters of
public concern even when those matters were connected to their
public employment. 149 On the other hand, Pickering noted that “the
State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in
connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in
general.” 150 Thus, Pickering instructed courts to balance “the interests
of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”151
In striking this Pickering balance, the Court specially protected
speech on a matter of public concern. 152 Specifically, the Court
147

See Moss, supra note 18, at 1639; discussion infra Part II.
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 564–
65 (1968).
149
Id. at 568 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967)
(“The theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be
subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly
rejected.”)); see also Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (“[T]he
unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had no right to object to conditions
placed upon the terms of employment . . . including those which restricted the
exercise of constitutional rights.”).
150
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
151
Id.
152
See id. at 568, 573.
148
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declared that “[t]he public’s interest in having free and unhindered
debate on matters of public importance [remained] the core value of
the Free Speech Clause.” 153 The Pickering Court also noted that the
Court especially protected speech on a matter of public concern in
other free speech contexts when it weakened the protections public
officials and figures received against libelous statements related to
their official conduct 154 and the protections individuals received
against invasions of privacy when the invasive statement involved a
matter of public interest. 155 Furthermore, the Court recognized that
public employees, “as a class, [were] the members of a community
most likely to possess informed and definite opinions” on the public
questions related to their employment. 156 Since the informed opinions
of public employees on matters of public concern remained critical to
the “free and open debate . . . vital to informed decision-making by the
electorate,” the Court found it “essential that [public employees] be
able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of
[retaliation].” 157
On the other side of the Pickering balance, the Court considered
the government’s interest in promoting the efficiency, integrity, and
proper discipline of its employees. 158 Consequently, the Pickering
Court established a number of relevant factors in evaluating the effect
of the employee’s speech on the government’s interests as an
employer. 159 Pickering noted that the government’s interests in
restricting the employee’s speech were stronger when the employee’s
speech was (1) directed to people the employee shared daily contact
with, (2) adversely affected discipline by immediate supervisors or
disrupted workplace harmony, (3) impeded the employee’s
performance of duties or interfered with the regular operations of the
153
154

Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
Id. at 573–74. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254

(1964).
155

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573–74. See generally Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374 (1967).
156
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.
157
Id. at 571–72.
158
Id. at 568; see also Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 150–51 (1983).
159
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569–70.
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workplace, and (4) the employer-employee relationship was of a
personal and intimate nature necessarily requiring loyalty and
confidences to properly function. 160 Since the Pickering employee’s
speech “only tangentially and insubstantially” involved matters related
to his employment, the Pickering balance favored the employee’s right
to speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern. 161
Thus, Pickering demonstrated how the Court protected critically
important First Amendment speech while not unduly interfering with
the government’s unique interests in restricting that speech. 162 Later,
in Connick and Garcetti, the Court refined the public concern and
Pickering balancing tests to afford additional weight to the
government’s unique interests. 163
B. Connick v. Meyers
Connick definitively established that a public employee’s speech
must involve a matter of public concern to even merit further
adjudication in the form of the Pickering balancing test. 164 In Connick,
an Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) was fired after she contested a
position transfer by writing and distributing a questionnaire that
solicited the views of her fellow staff members about office transfer
policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of
confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to
work in political campaigns. 165 The Court dismissed the ADA’s free
speech retaliation claim by holding that the ADA did not engage in

160

Id.
Id. at 574.
162
See discussion infra Part II.A.
163
See discussion supra Part II.B–C.
164
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 154. Connick still held that the First Amendment
afforded limited protection to public employee speech that did not involve a matter
of public concern. Id. However, Connick claimed that the federal judiciary possessed
virtually no role in adjudicating public employee speech that did not involve a matter
of public concern, and should defer to the employer’s personnel decisions “absent
the most unusual circumstances.” Id.
165
Id. at 140–42.
161
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protected speech. 166 Specifically, Connick held that “[w]hen employee
expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community, government
officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without
intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First
Amendment.” 167 Thus, Connick deferred to the employer’s interests
by (1) refusing to engage in the Pickering balance when the
employee’s speech did not involve a matter of public concern and (2)
strengthening the government’s interests in the Pickering balance
when the context of the employee’s speech about matters of public
concern directly implicated the employer’s interests in performing
public services. 168
Furthermore, Connick clarified two additional factors for courts to
consider when performing the Pickering balancing test. First, Connick
noted that “the state’s burden in justifying a particular discharge
varie[d] depending upon the nature of the employee’s expression.” 169
Hence, when the employee’s speech concerned itself more with
causing insubordination and disrupting close working relationships
than matters of public concern, the Court afforded “a wide degree of
deference to the employer’s judgment.” 170 This deference allowed the
employer to prevent the employee from disrupting the office and
destroying working relationships before such events unfolded. 171
Second, Connick considered the time, place, and manner of the

166

Id. at 147–49, 154. Specifically, Connick held that the ADA’s speech about
pressure to work in political campaigns entailed a matter of public concern, but that
all the other speech merely reflected her personal grievances with internal office
policy. Id. Accordingly, the Court applied the Pickering balance test to the ADA’s
speech about pressure to work in political campaigns, but the Court favored the
employer’s interests, because the ADA’s speech was designed to cause
insubordination among the close working relationships essential to perform the
public services. Id. at 151–52.
167
Id. at 146.
168
Id. at 146–47, 150–53.
169
Id. at 150.
170
Id. at 151–52.
171
Id. at 152.
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employee’s speech. 172 Speech at the workplace, especially if it
violated office policy, tilted the balance in favor of the government’s
interest in institutional efficiency. 173 In Garcetti, the Court further
strengthened the employer’s interest in restricting “workplace speech”
by categorically removing such speech from any First Amendment
protection. 174
C. Garcetti v. Ceballos
Garcetti held that “when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not
insulate their communications from employer discipline.” 175 In
Garcetti, a deputy district attorney complained that he suffered
retaliation for writing a memorandum about misrepresentations in a
warrant affidavit, speaking to his supervisors about his opinions, and
testifying for the defense at a suppression hearing concerning the
warrant. 176 Since the employee’s speech “owe[d] its existence to [the]
. . . employee’s professional responsibilities,” government restrictions
on the employee’s speech failed to implicate “any liberties the
employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.” 177
The Garcetti Court removed an employee’s speech about matters
of public concern from First Amendment protection because
“[e]mployers have heightened interests in controlling speech made by
an employee in his or her professional capacity.” 178 Since
“government employers . . . need a significant degree of control over
their employees’ words and actions” to efficiently provide public
services, 179 the Court substantially deferred to the government’s
172

Id.
Id. at 152–53.
174
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006); discussion infra Part
173

II.C.
175

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
Id. at 413–15.
177
Id. at 421–22.
178
Id. at 422.
179
Id. at 418.
176
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interests by removing employees’ speech from constitutional
protection. 180 The Court further refrained from adjudicating
employees’ speech made pursuant to their official duties because a
contrary ruling would “demand permanent judicial intervention in the
conduct of governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with
sound principles of federalism and the separation of powers.” 181
Hence, the Court’s public employee free speech jurisprudence
showed that courts can provide definition and protection to free
speech rights while also affording substantial deference to the
government’s unique interests in restricting free speech rights.
Unfortunately, the federal circuits’ approaches to prisoners’ free
speech retaliation claims failed to accomplish the same results by not
extending the public concern and Pickering balancing tests to
prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims.
III. THE APPROACHES OF OTHER FEDERAL CIRCUITS TO PRISONERS’
FREE SPEECH RETALIATION CLAIMS
Interestingly, none of the federal circuits expressly held that the
public concern test applied to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims,
but none of the circuits explicitly held the opposite until the Seventh
Circuit decided Bridges. 182 Only the Sixth Circuit exhaustively
considered whether the public concern test should apply to prisoners’
First Amendment retaliation claims before ultimately leaving the
question undecided. 183 The Second and Third Circuits doubted the
applicability of the public concern test to the prison context by merely
commenting, without much explanation, that prisoners’ First
Amendment retaliation claims typically addressed matters of personal
180

See id. at 422–23.
Id. at 423. Presumably, the federalism concerns developed from federal
courts adjudicating the First Amendment claims of state employees, while the
separation of powers concerns derived from courts interfering with the public offices
of the other co-equal branches of government. See id.
182
See Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 550–51 (7th Cir. 2009); Thaddeus-X
v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 391 (6th Cir. 1999).
183
See discussion infra Part III.A.
181
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concern. 184 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits summarily applied the Pell
test to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims without even
considering the public concern test. 185 In so doing, the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits’ approaches shared many similarities to the Seventh
Circuit approach in Bridges. Thus, this comment discusses the
approaches of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits to prisoners’ free
speech retaliation claims.
A. The Sixth Circuit’s Approach to Prisoner Free Speech
Retaliation Claims
In Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, the Sixth Circuit thoroughly discussed
the history and purpose of the prisoner and public employee free
speech doctrines when the court considered whether it should adopt
the public concern test for prisoners’ First Amendment retaliation
claims. 186 Specifically, the court expressly distinguished between
prisoners’ free speech rights and their right to access the courts under
the First Amendment’s Petition Clause. 187 The court reasoned that
prisoners possessed a “well-established constitutional right to access
the courts,” 188 which definitely and clearly survived incarceration
unlike the “less clear . . . contours of free speech rights in the prison
setting.” 189 Thus, the court held that no authority existed to further
limit prisoners’ “most ‘fundamental political right’ [to access the
184

See Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (refusing to
extend the public concern test to prisoners’ petitions for redress of grievances
because such petitions typically addressed matters of personal concern); cf. also
Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 283–84 (3d Cir. 2004) (refusing
to extend the public concern requirement to a private citizen’s free speech retaliation
claim; and, commenting in dicta that the Third Circuit permitted prisoners’ free
speech retaliation claims without applying a public concern requirement even though
prisoners’ “complaints are often highly particularized objections to alleged
individual mistreatment”).
185
See discussion infra Part III.B–C.
186
175 F.3d at 388–93.
187
Id. at 391–92.
188
Id. at 391; see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
189
Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 391.
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courts]” 190 by subjecting it to an additional public concern test. 191
Accordingly, the court refused to determine “the appropriateness of
explicitly applying the public concern limitation to prisoners, whose
free speech rights are uncontrovertedly limited by virtue of their
incarceration.” 192 The court’s analysis, however, provided a number of
salient points for the free speech analysis.
First, the Thaddeus-X defendants disputed the prisoners’ free
speech claim by arguing that the prisoners’ speech must involve a
matter of public concern to receive First Amendment protection
against retaliation so that prisoners do not possess potentially greater
free speech rights than public employees. 193 The court unequivocally
agreed by observing that “[p]risoners certainly do not have greater free
speech rights than public employees.” 194 Second, the court found it
helpful to draw upon the public employee free speech jurisprudence
when analyzing other free speech retaliation claims because the bulk
of First Amendment retaliation claims arose in the public employee
setting. 195 Third, the court reasoned that the public concern test should
not limit prisoners’ most valued right to access the courts because the
test initially developed to broaden public employees’ free speech

190

Id. at 391 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., concurring)).
191
Id. at 392. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that applying the public concern test
to prisoners’ right to access the courts would eliminate virtually all prisoner suits
because such suits were nearly always a matter of personal concern to the prisoner.
Id. Alternatively, the Sixth Circuit recognized that it could hold that all prisoner suits
were per se matters of public concern because of the policies embodied in the
enabling statutes governing prisoners’ right to access the courts like the habeus
corpus and § 1983 statutes. Id. at 392 n.8. Yet, the Sixth Circuit realized that such a
holding had the same effect as not adopting a public concern test because the
prisoners’ right to access the courts would not be limited by the content of their suits.
Id.
192
Id. at 392.
193
Id. at 388.
194
Id. The court similarly asserted that “[a] prisoner’s First Amendment rights
are not more extensive than those of a government employee; in fact, under most
clauses of the First Amendment, they are much more strictly limited.” Id. at 392.
195
Id. at 388.
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rights. 196 Fourth, the court observed that the First Amendment
protected speech based on the context of the speech, and the differing
First Amendment analyses accounted for the various levels of
protection. 197 For instance, the free speech rights of an individual
varied depending on whether the individual spoke in a classic public
forum, 198 as a public employee in the public office, 199 or as a prisoner
in a prison cell. 200 Lastly, the court commented that “[t]he Pickering
balancing test . . . has been applied in a variety of First Amendment
settings,” 201 and “can . . . easily be applied in the prison context,
accommodating the difference between the government as employer
and as jailor.” 202 Yet, the court cautioned that the distinctions between
the public employees’ free speech rights and the prisoners’ valued
right to access the courts, the separate interests of the government
entities, and the dissimilar nature of the relationship between the
plaintiff and the government in the two settings meant that “any honest
attempt to perform the [Pickering] balancing . . . cannot unhesitatingly
import reasoning from the public employment setting into the prison
setting.” 203

196

See id. at 389, 393.
Id. at 388–89.
198
See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984) (noting that speakers in a classic public forum can say virtually anything
without government interference because government speech restrictions in class
public forums remained subject to strict scrutiny review; i.e., they must be contentneutral, leave open alternative channels of communication, and “narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest.”).
199
See discussion supra Part II.
200
See discussion supra Part I.
201
Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 392; see also Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr,
518 U.S. 668, 678 (1996) (applying the Pickering balancing test to evaluate an
independent contractor’s free speech retaliation claim).
202
Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 392.
203
Id. at 393. When the Seventh Circuit cited this language in Bridges v.
Gilbert to claim the Sixth Circuit doubted the propriety of applying a public concern
requirement to prisoners’ free speech, it failed to mention that this language
specifically referred to the right to access the courts. See 557 F.3d at 551–52.
197
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B. The Fifth Circuit’s Approach to Prisoner Free Speech
Retaliation Claims
Two Fifth Circuit cases, Jackson v. Cain 204 and Freeman v.
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 205 illustrated how the Fifth
Circuit used the Pell test to evaluate prisoners’ free speech claims
even when the court claimed to apply the Turner test. 206 As a result,
the Fifth Circuit further confused the status of prisoners’ free speech
rights and unduly interfered with the prerogatives of prison
officials. 207
In Jackson, prison officials allegedly retaliated against a prisoner
for writing a letter to the warden that complained about how the prison
failed to include some of the clothing he intended to transfer from his
old prison. 208 The court cited Pell to acknowledge that the prisoner
possessed a “First Amendment right to freedom of expression so long
as it is not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner and does not
adversely affect a legitimate state interest.” 209 Then, the court claimed
to extend the Turner test to the prisoner’s free speech retaliation
claim. 210 Yet, the court protected the prisoner’s expression by simply
holding—without reference to the Turner factors, standard of review,
or any further explanation—that “complaining about treatment by
means of a private letter to the warden can be compatible with the
acceptable behavior of a prisoner and thus may not adversely affect
the discipline of the prison.” 211 If the prison officials offered a
contrary assertion indicating that the prisoner’s letter was actually
inconsistent with legitimate penological objectives, the court either
failed to consider the level of appropriate deference to apply to such an
assertion or simply refused to defer to the prison officials’ assertion. 212
204

864 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1989).
369 F.3d 854 (5th Cir. 2004).
206
See discussion infra Part III.B.
207
See discussion infra Part III.B.
208
Jackson, 864 F.2d at 1238–39.
209
Id. at 1248 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
See id.
205
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Jackson thus showed that the court applied the Pell test to protect a
prisoner’s relatively low-value speech about missing laundry. 213
In Freeman, a prisoner alleged retaliation for circulating a
statement to his fellow inmates and non-incarcerated Church of Christ
leaders that criticized the chaplain, a prison official, for “depart[ing]
from the faith” and further requested that the chaplain no longer lead
the prisoner members of the Church of Christ. 214 The prisoner also
sought and received permission from the chaplain to read the
statement during a church service. 215 The chaplain ordered the
prisoner to stop reading the statement, and the prisoner quickly
complied. 216 Prison officials then escorted the prisoner from the
service, but roughly fifty other inmates also left the service with the
prisoner. 217 The prisoner later received a disciplinary violation for
causing a disturbance, which he argued retaliated against his freedom
of speech. 218
In deciding this case, the Fifth Circuit again applied just the Pell
test to recognize that prisoners retained a general First Amendment
right to criticize prison officials, prison conditions, and official
misconduct. 219 The court, however, restricted prisoners’ general right
to complain about prison conditions and official misconduct by
requiring prisoners to exercise this right in a manner consistent with
their status as a prisoner. 220 Consequently, the court held that “[p]rison
officials may legitimately punish inmates who verbally confront

213
214

See id.; discussion supra Part I.C.
Freeman v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 369 F.3d 854, 858 (5th Cir.

2004).
215

Id.
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id. The prisoner also made a free exercise and equal protection claim based
on the prison’s rules allegedly restricting the worship of Church of Christ members.
See id. at 860–63. These claims are not relevant to this comment.
219
Id. at 864 (citing Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1995);
Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040, 1046 (5th Cir. 1986)).
220
Id.
216
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institutional authority without running afoul of the First
Amendment.” 221
In applying the Pell test, the Freeman court ruled against the
prisoner’s free speech claim because the manner of his public criticism
was not consistent with his status as a prisoner. 222 According to the
court, the prisoner’s speech was inconsistent with his status because
the prisoner intended his speech to incite a disturbance and his speech
actually incited a disturbance. 223 Remarkably, this reasoning was
identical to the very protective standard the Court established for
evaluating government restrictions on speech advocating illegal action
in Brandenburg v. Ohio. 224 Additionally, the Freeman Court did not
mention if it determined that the prisoner’s speech was inconsistent
with his status by explicitly deferring to the judgment of the prison
officials or through its own independent evaluation of the speech. 225
Lastly, the court appeared to support the idea that prisoners retained no
free speech rights whatsoever because the Freeman prisoner could
have exercised his Petition Clause rights to make his criticism through
the prison’s internal grievance procedures, which would have further
prevented a disturbance or otherwise threaten internal prison
security. 226
221

Id. (citing Goff v. Dailey, 991 F.2d 1437, 1439 (8th Cir. 1993) (recognizing
that a “prison has a legitimate penological interest in punishing inmates for mocking
and challenging correctional officers by making crude personal statements about
them in a recreation room full of other inmates”)).
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional
guarantees of free speech . . . do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.”). Yet, in the prison setting, Court precedent established that prison officials
should have much greater leeway in restricting prisoners’ speech. See discussion
supra Part I.
225
See Freeman, 369 F.3d at 864.
226
Id.; see also Adams v. Gunnell, 729 F.2d 362, 367–68 (5th Cir. 1984)
(limiting prisoners’ right to collaborate in a prison-wide petition because available
internal grievances procedures better avoided the potential for inciting violence from
internally circulated petitions).
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Thus, Freeman demonstrated how the Fifth Circuit applied the
Pell test to prisoner’s free speech retaliation claims with unpredictable
results, ranging from no protection whatsoever to applying inflexible
and highly speech-protective legal rules to govern proper prison
administration.
C. The Eighth Circuit’s Approach to Prisoner Free Speech
Retaliation Claims
In Cornell v. Woods, 227 the Eighth Circuit applied just the Pell
test to hold that the First Amendment protected a prisoner’s right to
freely and truthfully respond to a prison official’s investigation of
another official’s misconduct without fear of retaliation. 228 In Cornell,
the head of the prison’s internal affairs division promised the prisonerclaimant immunity from discipline if the prisoner cooperated in the
investigation of another prison official’s suspected violation of prison
rules that prohibited transactions between prison employees and
prisoners. 229 The prisoner truthfully admitted that he made such a
transaction with the prison official, but later complained that he
suffered retaliation for participating in the investigation. 230
In deciding the case, the court first considered whether the
prisoner possessed a constitutional right to participate in the internal
prison investigation. 231 Initially, the court noted that ordinary citizens
enjoyed a constitutional privilege to freely participate in governmental
investigations. 232 The court also analogized to the limited First
Amendment rights of public employees by commenting that even
public employees remained “constitutionally shielded from employer
retaliation for their participation in investigations concerning matters
of public concern.” 233 Then, the court applied the Pell test to find that:
227

69 F.3d 1383 (8th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1388.
229
Id. at 1386.
230
Id.
231
Id. at 1388.
232
Id.
233
Id. (citing Gorman v. Robinson, 977 F.2d 350, 356 (7th Cir. 1992)).
228
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[T]he right to respond to a prison investigator’s inquiries
[was] not inconsistent with a person’s status as a prisoner or
with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system. To the contrary, . . . truthfully answering questions
concerning a misconduct investigation against a correctional
officer [was] undoubtedly quite consistent with legitimate
penological objectives. 234
The court, however, neglected to expressly consider the appropriate
level of deference or standard of review for any contrary claim made
by the prison officials that the prisoner’s speech was inconsistent with
legitimate penological objectives.235 Thus, the court may have simply
made its own judgment that the prisoner’s speech was “undoubtedly
quite consistent with legitimate penological objectives.” 236 Ultimately,
the court’s rule may also unduly prevent prison officials from
legitimately punishing prisoners who prison officials discovered
violated prison rules through misconduct investigations. 237
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ approaches represented the path the
Seventh Circuit later adopted in Bridges, while the Sixth Circuit’s
analysis demonstrated that the Seventh Circuit may have correctly
applied the public concern test to prisoners’ free speech retaliation
claims in the first place. This comment now reviews the Seventh
Circuit’s approach to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims.
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH TO PRISONER FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION CLAIMS IN BRIDGES V. GILBERT
The Seventh Circuit’s approach to evaluating prisoners’ free
speech retaliation claims depicted the unclear status of prisoners’ free
speech rights. 238 First, the Seventh Circuit unhesitatingly applied the
234

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
See id.
236
See id.
237
See id.
238
See discussion infra Parts IV–V.
235
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public concern test to the prison setting. 239 Then, after thoughtful
consideration, the Seventh Circuit claimed to adopt the Turner test for
prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims. 240 Yet, a careful reading of
the court’s opinion in Bridges v. Gilbert demonstrated that the Seventh
Circuit, like the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, applied the Pell test to
evaluate a prisoner’s free speech retaliation claim. 241 Accordingly,
Part IV of this comment reviews the Seventh Circuit’s prior support of
the public concern test for prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims and
the court’s opinion in Bridges to “bridge” the irregular and
unchartered waters of the Pell test. 242
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Prior Support for a Public Concern Test
for Prisoner Free Speech Retaliation Claims
The Seventh Circuit first signaled its support for applying the
public concern test to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims in
Brookins v. Kolb. 243 In Brookins, a prison inmate, who was the cochair of a prison paralegal committee, complained that prison officials
retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights to free
association and speech. 244 While acting as the co-chair of the paralegal
committee, the inmate wrote a letter advocating that the committee
pay for the polygraph testing of all the concerned parties in another
prisoner’s upcoming disciplinary proceedings. 245 The letter violated
prison rules requiring that a prison official authorize any committee
correspondence and disbursement of committee funds. 246 The court
rejected the inmate’s free speech claim, reasoning that the letter did
not involve a matter of public concern. 247 Yet, Brookins failed to
239

See discussion infra Part IV.A.
See discussion infra Part IV.D.
241
See discussion infra Parts IV.D., V.B.
242
See discussion infra Parts IV.A, IV.D.
243
990 F.2d 308, 313 (7th Cir. 1992), abrogated in part by Bridges v. Gilbert,
557 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2009).
244
Id. at 310.
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Id. at 313.
240

195
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009

37

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 6

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 5, Issue 1

Fall 2009

consider why the prisoner’s speech must involve a matter of public
concern to receive protection against retaliation. 248
In Sasnett v. Litscher, 249 Judge Posner summarily dismissed the
free speech claims of Protestant prisoners disputing prison regulations
that restricted them from wearing crosses outside their clothing. 250
While Judge Posner’s decision primarily held that the prisoners’ free
speech claims were merely duplicative of their valid free exercise
claims, 251 Judge Posner also reasoned that the free speech claims
failed by analogy to the Pickering line of cases because the prisoners
did not want to wear the crosses to make a public statement or convert
other inmates. 252
In McElroy v. Lopac, 253 a prison inmate complained that prison
officials retaliated against him for his inquiries into whether he would
receive “lay-in” pay while he awaited transfer from his prison sewing
job to another job after the prison closed the sewing factory.254 The
majority’s opinion rejected the prisoner’s free speech retaliation claim
because the prisoner’s questions about “lay-in” pay were a matter of
purely individual economic interest, and not a matter of public
concern. 255 The dissent argued that the prisoner’s inquiry involved a
matter of public concern to the prison population who lost their sewing
jobs and to the general public’s concern about compensating
unemployed prison workers. 256
Finally, in Pearson v. Welborn, 257 a prisoner claimed that he
suffered retaliation for complaining about the lack of yard time,
shackling of inmates to one another around a small table during group
therapy, and refusing to become a prison informant on prison gang
248

See id.
197 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 1999), abrogated in part by Bridges v. Gilbert, 557
F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2009).
250
Id. at 292.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
403 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
254
Id. at 856–57.
255
Id. at 858–59.
256
Id. at 859 (Fairchild, J., dissenting).
257
471 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2006).
249

196
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss1/6

38

Rose: Prisoners and Public Employees: Bridges to a New Future in Prison

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 5, Issue 1

Fall 2009

members while he was incarcerated in a new, restrictive security
environment designed to transfer prison inmates who renounced their
gang membership back into the general prison population. 258 The
prison officials argued that the prisoner possessed no general right to
complain about prison conditions, and that his complaints only
involved mere personal grievances. 259 The court held that the
prisoner’s complaints about the lack of yard time and shackling during
group therapy involved matters of sufficient public concern because
they urged a change in the prison policy for all the similarly
incarcerated prisoners and discussed how the prison operated its
fledgling program to transition prisoners from the restrictive
conditions at the maximum-security prison to the standard general
population prison. 260
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit’s application of the public concern
test to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims ended with the court’s
decision in Bridges v. Gilbert. Thus, this comment reviews the factual
allegations of Bridges before discussing the court’s opinion in Bridges.
B. Factual Allegations in Bridges v. Gilbert
On September 22, 2006, Jimmy Bridges alleged the following
facts were true according to his pro se § 1983 complaint that various
prison officials retaliated against him for exercising his First
Amendment rights to free speech, to access the courts, 261 and to
petition the government for redress of grievances. 262
258

Id. at 734–36.
Id. at 740.
260
Id. at 741–42.
261
This comment does not discuss Bridges’s First Amendment claim to a right
to access the courts. The court rejected this claim because Bridges made his affidavit
in support of Powe’s right to access the courts, but was not critical to vindicate
Powe’s right. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 544, 553–54 (7th Cir. 2009).
262
This comment also does not discuss Bridges’s claims concerning the right to
petition for redress of grievances. The court rejected this claim because (1) Bridges’s
threat to file a grievance did not constitute a protected grievance, (2) there was
insufficient retaliation, and (3) Bridges’s current suit encompassed any harm from
alleged prior infringements on his Petition Clause rights. Id. at 554–55.
259

197
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009

39

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 6

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 5, Issue 1

Fall 2009

While Bridges was a prisoner incarcerated at the Wisconsin
Secure Program Facility, he lived in a prison cell adjacent to the cell of
inmate Leon Powe. 263 On the night of March 14, 2003, Bridges heard
Powe complain about a terrible smell in his drinking cup and that he
had been vomiting. 264 A nurse brought Powe some Tylenol and
Tums. 265 The next morning, Bridges called through a vent to check on
Powe again. 266 Powe weakly responded that he was in pain and could
not eat. 267 Several prison officials came to Powe’s cell and told him to
eat, but Powe failed to respond. 268 Afterward, Powe told another group
of prison officials that he was in terrible pain and could not move. 269
The prison officials responded by threatening to beat-up Powe for not
responding to earlier inquiries. 270 Eventually, prison officials removed
Powe from his prison cell and brought him to the prison’s medical
center, but Powe died the following morning. 271
Later, Powe’s estate brought a wrongful death action against
several prison authorities. 272 In March 2005, attorneys for Powe’s
estate interviewed Bridges as a witness to the care Powe received. 273
Bridges supplied Powe’s attorneys with an affidavit and agreed to
testify as a trial witness. 274 The case settled before trial, but Powe’s
attorneys used Bridges’s affidavit in response to the prison officials’
motion for summary judgment. 275
After the case settled, Bridges believed that prison officials
subjected him to a campaign of harassment in retaliation for his

263

Id. at 544.
Id.
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
Id.
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id.
273
Id.
274
Id.
275
Id.
264
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participation in the Powe lawsuit. 276 Prison officials allegedly caused
delays in Bridges’s mail, repeatedly kicked open his cell door, turned
his cell light on and off, and loudly slammed his cell door shut when
he was sleeping. 277 Bridges complained about this treatment to a
prison guard. 278 In response, the guard filed a disciplinary charge
against Bridges that was later upgraded to a major offense indicating
that Bridges’s conduct created a serious risk of disruption at the
prison. 279 Eventually, Bridges was exonerated of any wrongdoing in
connection to the disciplinary charge. 280 Bridges also complained that
prison officials further retaliated against him by improperly treating
the grievances he filed about these incidents. 281
Ultimately, the district court dismissed Bridges’s complaint for
his failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure because, like Brookins, Bridges’s affidavit
only involved a matter personal to Powe’s estate and did not advocate
a change in prison policy or criticize the administration of prison
policy. 282
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion in Bridges v. Gilbert
On appeal, Bridges urged the Seventh Circuit to abandon its
support for a public concern test to prisoners’ free speech claims. 283
Instead, Bridges contended that the Seventh Circuit should apply the
legitimate penological interest tests from the Court’s prisoner free
speech jurisprudence to evaluate whether Bridges engaged in protected
speech. 284
In a decision written by Judge Tinder and joined by Chief Judge
Easterbrook and Judge Wood, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
276

Id. at 545.
Id.
278
Id.
279
Id.
280
Id.
281
Id.
282
See case cited supra note 22.
283
Bridges, 557 F.3d at 547.
284
Id. at 547, 551.
277
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court’s opinion in Bridges’s favor for his free speech retaliation
claim. 285 In so doing, the Seventh Circuit expressly disavowed its
support for the public concern test in prisoners’ free speech retaliation
claims. 286 The court, however, left open the possibility of applying the
public concern test for a prisoner-employee’s complaints about
compensation like in McElroy. 287 Since the panel’s decision overruled
the Seventh Circuit’s support for a public concern test in prisoners’
free speech retaliation claims, the panel circulated its decision among
all the judges of the Seventh Circuit in regular active service to
determine if a majority of the judges favored a rehearing en banc
pursuant to the Seventh Circuit’s Rule 40(e), but no judge favored a
rehearing. 288
Instead of applying the public concern test to prisoners’ free
speech retaliation claims, the court claimed to adopt the Turner test. 289
The court’s opinion in Bridges advanced three principal reasons to
support its purported adoption of the Turner test. 290 First, the court
held that the Turner test constituted the proper test for evaluating
prisoners’ asserted constitutional interests.291 Second, the court
reasoned that public employees voluntarily chose the restrictions on
their free speech rights by accepting public employment, while
imprisonment remained involuntary. 292 Third, the court held that
applying a public concern test to prisoners’ speech would
unnecessarily restrict prisoners’ rights more than required to preserve
legitimate penological interests.293 This comment discusses in turn
Bridges’s analysis of its three principal reasons for adopting the
Turner test.

285

Id. at 551–52, 555–56.
Id. at 551 n.2.
287
Id. at 552 n.3; see also McElroy v. Lopac, 403 F.3d 855, 858–59 (7th Cir.
2005) (per curiam).
288
Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551 n.2; see also 7TH CIR. R. 40(e).
289
Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551.
290
See id. at 550.
291
Id.
292
Id.
293
Id.
286
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First and foremost, the court chose to evaluate prisoners’ free
speech retaliation claims under the Turner test rather than the public
concern test because the court acknowledged that the two tests
developed in two different contexts to account for the unique
institutional differences between public employment and prisons. 294
Specifically, the court recognized that the Court created the public
concern test “to maintain the delicate balance between a citizen’s right
to speak (and the public interest in having thoughtful debate) and the
employer’s need to effectively provide government services,” while
the Court formed the legitimate penological interests tests “to preserve
some free speech rights for prisoners in a restrictive and challenging
environment where prison officials must be focused on crime
deterrence, prisoner rehabilitation, and internal prison security.” 295
Second, the court rejected applying the public concern test to
prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims because the court placed
significant emphasis on the notion that public employees voluntarily
consented to the limitations on their freedoms whereas prisoners
remained incarcerated against their will. 296 The court justified the
differing levels of constitutional protection between prisoners and
public employees by reasoning that “obviously, a citizen has the
choice to enter into public employment, while imprisonment is not
voluntary.” 297 Similarly, when discussing in dicta the applicability of a
public concern test to the speech of a prisoner-employee, the court
commented that “[t]he official interest in the efficient provision of
[government] services, coupled with the benefits to the prisoner from
taking the job, may justify a public concern limitation on the
prisoner’s speech made as an employee.” 298
Third, the court held that applying the public concern test to
prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims would eliminate virtually all
constitutional protection afforded to prisoner speech. 299 Instead of
294

See id.
Id.
296
See id.
297
Id. (emphasis added).
298
Id. at 552 n.3 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
299
See id. at 550.
295
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expressly arguing that prisoner speech rarely involved a matter of
public concern (like the Second and Third Circuits), the court
observed that applying Garcetti’s distinction between speech as a
public employee and as a citizen would be impossible in the prison
context. 300 Specifically, the court reasoned that because prisoners
remained “[s]hut-off from the outside world, the prisoner’s speech
would nearly always be speech made as a prisoner rather than as a
citizen.” 301 Similarly, when discussing in dicta if the public concern
test should apply to a prisoner-employee’s speech, the court observed
that “the degree of control exercised by officials over all aspects of a
prisoner’s life may make any distinction between speech as an inmate
and speech as a prisoner-employee unworkable.” 302 Lastly, the panel
also noted that a public concern test for prisoners’ free speech
retaliation claims needlessly imposed an additional barrier that
“seem[ed] to restrict prisoners’ constitutional rights far more than is
‘justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.’” 303
Finally, the court purportedly applied the Turner test to protect
Bridges’s speech in the affidavit. 304 Yet, the court protected Bridges’s
speech by simply holding that “[p]roviding an eyewitness account . . .
of an incident where prison officials are alleged to have mistreated an
inmate who was gravely ill (and later died) is not inconsistent with
legitimate penological interests.”305 The panel supported its holding
only by analogizing to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Cornell. 306
Thus, the court declared that “[p]risons have an interest in keeping the
inmates as safe and secure as possible while imprisoned, and truthful
speech that describes possible abuses can actually be quite consistent
with that objective.” 307 Accordingly, the court concluded that
“Bridges . . . adequately alleged, for the purposes of surviving a
300

Id.; see also cases cited supra note 184 and accompanying text.
Bridges, 557 F.3d at 550 (internal quotations omitted).
302
Id. at 552 n.3.
303
Id. at 550 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
304
See id. at 551–52.
305
Id. at 551.
306
Id.; see also discussion supra Part III.C.
307
Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551.
301
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motion to dismiss, that he engaged in activity protected by the First
Amendment.” 308
V. EVALUATION OF BRIDGES: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN PELL,
TURNER, AND THE FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF PRISONERS AND
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES.
Part V first argues that the Seventh Circuit’s disavowal of the
public concern test in the prison context likely conformed with, but
was not required by, Supreme Court precedent. Then, Part V contends
that the court likely erred in actually applying the relatively
unexamined and indeterminate Pell test to protect Bridges’s allegedly
truthful speech about prison abuses with unfortunate consequences for
the clarity of prisoners’ free speech rights and the prerogatives of
prison officials. Lastly, Part V argues that the court should have
continued to use a modified version of the public concern and
Pickering balancing tests for prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims
because those tests offered clarity and protection to important First
Amendment speech, provided sufficient deference to prison officials’
needs, and ensured that prisoners do not possess potentially greater
free speech rights than public employees.
A. The Seventh Circuit Likely Conformed to Court Precedent
by Disavowing the Public Concern Test for Prisoners’ Free
Speech Retaliation Claims
In rejecting the public concern test and purportedly adopting the
Turner test to evaluate prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims, the
Seventh Circuit likely conformed to the Court’s precedent. Although
the Court’s prisoner and public employee free speech jurisprudences
do not expressly affirm or reject applying the public concern and
Pickering balancing tests to prisoners’ free speech retaliation
claims, 309 Bridges correctly reasoned that the Court created the public
concern and legitimate penological interests tests to account for and
308
309

Id. at 551–52.
See supra notes 11, 15 and accompanying text.
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evaluate the level of First Amendment protection in two different
institutional contexts. 310 While the Court’s approach to create a First
Amendment “doctrine for every institution” may actually exaggerate
institutional uniqueness to the detriment of protecting fundamental
free speech rights and promoting uniformity in the law, 311 the Sixth
Circuit rightly observed that “context matters” in the Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence. 312 Hence, even though the Court applied
the public concern and Pickering balancing tests to other free speech
claims, 313 because the Court created the public concern and
penological interest tests to accommodate the First Amendment
distinctions in two different institutional contexts, inferior courts likely
remained bound to following the Court’s tests for each context. 314
Furthermore, the Court’s opinion in Shaw v. Murphy provided the
Seventh Circuit with sufficient precedential support to reject the public
concern test for prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims. 315 First, the
Shaw Court declared that “Turner . . . adopted a unitary, deferential
standard for reviewing prisoners’ constitutional claims.” 316 Secondly,
the Shaw Court specifically refused to enhance the constitutional
protections of a prisoner’s speech based on the content of the
prisoner’s speech because “the Turner test, by its terms, simply does
not accommodate valuations of content.” 317
310

See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551; discussion supra Part IV.C.
See Moss, supra note 18, at 1671. Moss argued for evaluating the First
Amendment claims of public school students, public employees, and prisoners under
intermediate scrutiny review because the Court’s current approaches exaggerated the
risk of affording greater protection to constitutionally guaranteed rights. Id. at 1644–
45, 1674–79. Moss further asserted that the Court’s strict scrutiny review of racial
discrimination claims in each of these institutional settings proved the Court not only
exaggerated the risks in the First Amendment setting, but also caused disharmony in
the law by granting different levels of constitutional protection to similar
fundamental rights in the same institutional settings. Id. at 1674–79.
312
See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999); discussion
supra Part III.A.
313
See cases cited supra notes 154–55, 201.
314
See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551.
315
See 532 U.S. 223, 228–30 (2001); supra note 126 and accompanying text.
316
Shaw, 532 U.S. at 229.
317
Id. at 229; see also supra note 126 and accompanying text.
311
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While Shaw incorrectly claimed that Turner adopted a “unitary”
standard for evaluating prisoners’ constitutional claims, 318 the Court
consistently applied just the Turner test to evaluate prisoners’ asserted
free speech claims. 319 Additionally, if the Seventh Circuit adopted the
public concern test for prisoners’ free speech claims, then the Seventh
Circuit would necessarily make a valuation of the content of the
prisoners’ speech by preferring prisoners’ speech on a matter of public
concern. 320 Shaw rejected such preferential valuations based on the
content of a prisoner’s speech because they (1) contravened Turner’s
singular focus between the prison’s legitimate interests and the
prison’s restrictions on speech and (2) frustrated the Court’s policy of
deference to prison officials by requiring courts to undertake a greater
role in adjudicating prison affairs. 321 Arguably, if the public concern
test actually limited the constitutional protection granted to prisoner
speech, then Shaw may implicitly endorse the test. 322 In any event,
Shaw provided sufficient precedential support for the Seventh
Circuit’s decision to reject the public concern test in favor of the
Turner test when evaluating prisoners’ free speech retaliation
claims. 323
318

Turner clearly failed to adopt a “unitary” standard for reviewing prisoners’
constitutional claims. The Court extended Turner in Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S.
126 (2003) (prisoners’ First Amendment right to freedom of association); Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (prisoners’ First Amendment right of access to the
courts); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (prisoners’ due process right
against involuntary medication); and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342
(1987) (prisoners’ First Amendment right to free exercise of religion). Yet, the Court
refused to extend Turner in Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (prisoners’
Fourteenth Amendment right against invidious racial discrimination); McKune v.
Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002) (prisoners’ Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination); and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (prisoners’ Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment).
319
See discussion supra Part I.
320
See Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (“Whether . . . speech
addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and
context of a given statement.”).
321
Shaw, 532 U.S. at 230.
322
See id.
323
See id.
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B. The Seventh Circuit Incorrectly Applied the Pell Test
Instead of the Turner Test to Evaluate Bridges’s Free
Speech Retaliation Claim
Although the Seventh Circuit likely conformed to Court precedent
by purportedly adopting the Turner test to evaluate Bridges’s free
speech retaliation claim, the court probably erred by actually applying
the Pell test when it considered Bridges’s free speech retaliation claim.
Consequently, the court’s attempt to navigate the relatively
unchartered waters of the Pell test left the court making its own
judgments about proper prison procedure with potentially vast
consequences for prisoners’ free speech rights and prison officials’
pursuit of legitimate penological objectives.
Like the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit clearly
applied the Pell test rather than the Turner test when the court
evaluated Bridges’s free speech claim. 324 In claiming to apply the
Turner test to Bridges’s free speech claim, the Seventh Circuit failed
to quote the language of the Turner test, apply the Turner factors,
evaluate the rational basis between the prison officials’ actions and the
prison’s legitimate interests, explicitly invoke rational basis review, or
expressly consider the level of deference it afforded to the prison
officials. 325
Instead, the court merely held that Bridges sufficiently alleged a
free speech retaliation claim because his eyewitness account of an
incident where prison officials allegedly mistreated a gravely ill
inmate was not inconsistent with legitimate penological objectives. 326
Had the Seventh Circuit correctly applied the Turner test, then the
court would have questioned if the prison’s allegedly retaliatory
actions possessed a reasonable relationship to the prison’s legitimate
penological interests. 327
For example, if the Seventh Circuit applied the Turner test, the
Bridges prison officials could have asserted that they engaged in the
324

See discussion supra Parts III.B–C, IV.C.
See discussion supra Parts I.B, IV.C.
326
See Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 551 (7th Cir. 2009).
327
See supra note 349.
325
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allegedly retaliatory actions because—in their expert judgment—such
actions reasonably related to the prison’s legitimate interests in having
Bridges use the prison’s internal grievance system to report official
abuse or request medical attention. 328 As the Fifth Circuit similarly
recognized in Freeman, such internal grievance systems not only
preserved prisoners’ First Amendment rights (to petition, not to
speak), but also decreased the risk of violence from prisoners’ public
criticisms of officials’ conduct and “kept inmates as safe and secure as
possible while imprisoned” by swiftly assessing the need to provide
medical services and punish official abuse. 329 If the Seventh Circuit
applied the Turner test to this contention, then the court likely would
have concluded that the prison officials possessed a rational basis for
restricting Bridges’s speech. 330
Furthermore, because the court did not question the
reasonableness of restricting Bridges’s allegedly truthful speech about
prison abuses under the Turner test, the court formed a rigid rule
categorically protecting prisoners’ allegations about prison abuses. 331
By simply applying the Pell test to hold that prisoners’ allegedly
truthful speech about prison abuses was not inconsistent with
legitimate penological objectives, the court determined that restricting
such speech remained unreasonably inconsistent with legitimate
penological objectives unless the court later drew an exception to its
rule. 332 Yet, restrictions on prisoners’ speech about prison abuses may
be entirely consistent with legitimate penological objectives. For
328

See discussion supra Parts I.B, IV.B; cf. also Freeman v. Tex. Dep’t of
Criminal Justice, 369 F.3d 854, 864 (5th Cir. 2004).
329
See Freeman, 369 F.3d at 864; Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551. This argument
could also imply that prisoners’ free speech rights remained entirely inconsistent
with incarceration under the Pell test, especially where prisons operated grievance
procedures. See Freeman, 369 F.3d at 864.
330
See id.; discussion supra Part I.B. The prison officials’ actions would be
logically connected to the prison’s legitimate interest in responding appropriately to
prisoners’ requests for medical attention or complaints about official abuse instead of
waiting to dispute such information in an adversarial lawsuit. See Bridges, 557 F.3d
at 544–45; discussion supra Part I.B.
331
See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551; discussion supra Part I.C.
332
See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551.
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instance, prison officials may want to restrict prisoners’ complaints
about prison abuses due to the potential danger to incite a riot like in
Freeman or because of its insulting, demonstrably false, or otherwise
unproductive character. 333 Thus, while it may be reasonable in some
instances to restrict prisoners’ speech about prison abuses, the court’s
rule in Bridges unduly threatens prison officials with liability for
appropriately responding to speech threatening the prison’s legitimate
interests.
Finally, the court protected Bridges’s allegedly truthful speech
describing prison abuses by making its own judgment that such speech
remained consistent with the prison’s interest in keeping “inmates as
safe and secure as possible while imprisoned.” 334 Consequently, the
court not only contravened Court precedent explicitly instructing
courts to not make judgments about proper prison administration, but
the Seventh Circuit’s judgments may unduly impede proper prison
administration. 335
For instance, the court’s decision in Bridges failed to mention the
level of deference it applied to any of the prison officials’ contrary
contentions that Bridges’s speech was inconsistent with
incarceration. 336 Instead, the court reasoned from the Eighth Circuit’s
determination in Cornell that truthful speech about prison official
abuses was consistent with imprisonment. 337 Even if the Eighth
Circuit made its own judgment about proper prison administration in
Cornell, the court merely enforced the prison officials’ promise of
immunity to the prisoner for participating in the prison’s own
investigation; i.e., the Eighth Circuit only extended protection to
prison-solicited prisoner speech. 338 Conversely, the Seventh Circuit’s
rule may allow the inmates to run the asylum by protecting unsolicited
allegations about prison abuses even if such speech interfered with

333

See Freeman, 369 F.3d at 864; discussion supra Part I.A–B.
See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551.
335
See discussion supra Part I.A–C; discussion infra Part V.B.
336
See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551.
337
Id. (citing Cornell v. Woods, 69 F.3d 1383, 1388 (8th Cir. 1995)).
338
See discussion supra Part III.C.
334
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prison officials’ legitimate penological interests.339 Essentially, the
Seventh Circuit’s rule treated prisoners as potentially helpful assistants
in prison administration. 340 While prison officials may act wisely by
not retaliating against prisoners’ allegedly truthful speech about prison
abuses, the Court’s precedent left this judgment to prison officials, and
not the dictates of the First Amendment. 341
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit’s application of the Pell test to
Bridges’s free speech retaliation claim arguably supplanted the prison
officials’ judgment of proper prison administration and created a
categorical rule that may unduly interfere with prison officials’
provision of legitimate penological objectives. Lastly, while the
Seventh Circuit applied the Pell test to protect Bridges’s speech, future
applications of the Pell test may leave prisoners’ speech completely
unprotected.
C. The Seventh Circuit Should Have Adapted the Public
Concern and Pickering Balancing Tests to Evaluate
Bridges’s Free Speech Retaliation Claim
Instead of applying the legitimate penological interest tests to
prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims, the Seventh Circuit should
have considered balancing Bridges’s speech as a prisoner on a matter
of public concern against the prison’s legitimate penological interests
in restricting Bridges’s speech. Such an approach proves more
workable than the legitimate penological interest tests, protects critical
free speech rights, and ensures that prisoners do not possess
potentially broader free speech rights than public employees.

339

See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551.
See id.
341
See cf. Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983) (“While as a matter of
good judgment, public officials should be receptive to constructive criticism offered
by their employees, the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run
as a roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs.”); see
discussion supra Part I.
340
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1. The Public Concern and Pickering Balancing Tests Evaluate
Prisoners’ Free Speech Retaliation Claims Better than the
Legitimate Penological Interests Tests
As the Sixth Circuit recognized, the public concern and Pickering
balancing tests are easily adaptable to the prison context provided
courts perform an honest attempt to not unhesitatingly import
reasoning from the public employee setting to the prison context. 342
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that applying the public concern test to
the prison context resulted in an unworkable rule because (1) prisoners
rarely spoke as citizens on matters of public concern and (2) prisoners’
complaints generally involved matters of purely private concern. 343
However, the Seventh Circuit’s prior applications of the public
concern test to prisoners’ free speech claims should resolve both of
these concerns. 344
In addressing this first concern, the Seventh Circuit largely
ignored the requirement that prisoners must speak as a citizen. 345 Such
an approach may be appropriate because prisoners generally and
necessarily lack the freedom public employees possess to exercise
their dual rights as citizens. 346 Yet, prisoners often speak as citizens,
especially when they engage in any outgoing communications; i.e.,
communications intended for use outside the prison walls like writing
letters, articles, books, etc. 347 For instance, Bridges probably spoke as
342

Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 392 (6th Cir. 1999); see also
discussion supra Part III.A .
343
Bridges, 557 F.3d at 550; see also cases cited supra note 184 and
accompanying text.
344
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
345
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
346
See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 550, 552 n.3. Compare discussion supra Part I,
with discussion supra Part II.
347
Cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–22 (2006) (holding that the
public employee did not speak as a citizen when he wrote the memorandum pursuant
to his official duties); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 411–12 (1989) (holding
that prisoners’ incoming communications posed a greater threat to internal prison
security than outgoing communications because outgoing communications were not
intended for an inmate audience and officials could readily identify the predictable
dangers from outside communications).
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a citizen when he gave his affidavit in a legal proceeding. 348 While
Bridges owed the existence of his speech describing possible prison
abuses to his status as a prisoner, Bridges did not make his speech
pursuant to any duties he possessed as a prisoner. 349 In any event,
simply evaluating the prisoner’s speech as a prisoner resolves this
concern. If the government-as-jailor possesses special interests in
restricting a prisoner’s speech as a prisoner compared to a prisoner’s
speech as a citizen, then the Pickering balancing test can properly
account for those interests by giving stronger weight to the
government’s interests. 350
In addressing the second concern, the Seventh Circuit’s prior
applications of the public concern test prove that the test is readily
applicable to the prison setting. 351 The Seventh Circuit’s precedent
showed that prisoners’ speech involved a matter of public concern if
the speech urged a change in prison policy, criticized the official
administration of prison policy, informed the general public about how
the government operated important prison institutions, or involved a
matter of concern to the prison population. 352 This not only protects a
significant quantum of prisoner speech, but it offers protection to
roughly the same type of speech that courts categorically protected
348

Compare Bridges, 557 F.3d at 544–45 (prisoner providing an affidavit in a
public lawsuit), with Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22 (employee writing a
memorandum pursuant to his official duties).
349
See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
350
See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563,
569–70 (1968); Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983) (stating that “the
State’s burden in justifying [its interests] varie[d] depending upon the nature of the
employee's expression.”).
351
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
352
Brookins v. Kolb, 990 F.2d 308, 313 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that prisoners’
speech urging a change of prison policy or criticizing official administration of
prison policy involved a matter of public concern); Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d
732, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that prisoner’s speech informing the general
public about the internal operations of a new prison program to integrate gang
members into the general prison population involved a matter of public concern); see
also McElroy v. Lopac, 403 F.3d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (Fairchild, J., dissenting)
(claiming that prisoner’s speech about “lay-in” pay after prison terminated prisoners’
sewing jobs involved a matter of public concern to the respective prison population).
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under their applications of the Pell test. 353 Moreover, prisoners can
pursue purely private concerns through the prison’s internal grievance
procedures or by otherwise exercising their Petition Clause rights. 354
As the Sixth Circuit warranted, this distinction between prisoners’ free
speech and petition rights may be justified because prisoners possess a
well-established and well-regulated right to petition unlike their
ambiguous and more restricted free speech rights. 355 Also, because
prisoners’ individual free speech rights can be justified largely due to
the public’s interest in “free and unhindered debate on matters of
public importance,” unlike prisoners’ highly individualized right to
petition, a public concern test may be uniquely appropriate and
workable for prisoners’ free speech claims. 356
More importantly, the Seventh Circuit should have recognized
that both of the legitimate penological interest tests form unworkable
rules in evaluating prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims. The Pell
test either (1) forces courts to make their own improper judgments
about appropriate prison administration with the consequence of
dictating inflexible categorical rules to prison officials, (2) allows
courts to defer absolutely to prison officials, or (3) permits courts to
simply determine that prisoners retained no free speech rights
whatsoever. 357 As for the Turner test, it compels courts to defer too
much to prison officials, with the consequence of recognizing
practically no prisoner free speech rights and remaining especially
unworkable in evaluating free speech retaliation claims. 358
Since the Turner test protects prisoners’ free speech retaliation
claims only if the prison officials’ allegedly retaliatory actions possess
no reasonable relation to the prison’s legitimate penological concerns,
the test conflated the third element in prisoners’ free speech retaliation
353

See discussion supra Parts III.B–C, IV.C.
See, e.g., Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2000).
355
See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 391–92 (6th Cir. 1999).
356
See id.; cf. also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391
U.S. 563, 571–72 (1968) (protecting public employees’ limited free speech right to
speak on a matter of public concern because the First Amendment specially
protected the public’s interest in free and unhindered debate).
357
See discussion supra Parts I.C., V.B.
358
See discussion supra Parts I.B–C, V.B.; discussion infra Part V.C.1.
354
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claims with the first element. 359 In the first element to a prisoner’s free
speech retaliation claim, the prisoner must prove that they engaged in
activity protected by the First Amendment; and in the third element,
the prisoner must prove that the First Amendment activity was at least
a motivating factor in the prison officials’ decision to take the
retaliatory action. 360 The Turner test conflates these two elements
because courts would likely determine if the prison officials’ allegedly
retaliatory actions possess a reasonable relation to the legitimate
penological objective by inquiring into the prison officials’ motivation
for suppressing the prisoners’ speech. 361 Hence, if a prisoner’s
freedom of speech forms a motivating factor in the prison official’s
retaliatory actions, then the prison official’s actions probably possess
no reasonable relationship to legitimate penological objectives unless
the prisoner’s freedom of speech remains fundamentally inconsistent
with legitimate penological objectives. 362 Since the Pell test ultimately
questions whether a prisoner’s free speech rights remains
fundamentally inconsistent with legitimate penological objectives,
courts understandably found themselves applying the undefined and
indeterminate Pell test to evaluate prisoners’ free speech retaliation
claims. 363
Unlike the legitimate penological interest tests, the Court
established the public concern and Pickering balancing tests to
specifically evaluate the level of constitutional protection in free
speech retaliation claims. 364 Thus, as the Sixth Circuit implicitly
recognized, a test that adapts the Court’s sole test for evaluating free
speech retaliation claims to the prison context may better account for
the institutional uniqueness of prisons than blindly applying the
current legitimate penological interest tests to prisoners’ free speech
retaliation claims. 365
359

See discussion supra Parts I.B–C.
See, e.g., Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009).
361
See discussion supra Parts I.B–C, V.C.1.
362
See discussion supra Parts I.B–C, V.C.1.
363
See discussion supra Parts I.B–C, III.B–C, IV.C.
364
See discussion supra Parts I–II.
365
See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 389 (6th Cir. 1999).
360
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Furthermore, the Pickering balancing test may prove more
practical for evaluating prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims than
the legitimate penological interest tests for three primary reasons.
First, courts can easily adapt the Pickering factors to deal with prisons’
unique interests in performing legitimate penological objectives, and
lots of the current Pickering factors similarly apply to the prison
context. 366 For instance, Connick affords “a wide degree of deference
to the employer’s judgment” when the employee’s speech concerns
itself more with causing insubordination or violates office policy; and,
this wide degree of deference even allows employers to take action
before a disruption unfolded. 367 Likewise, prison officials should
probably receive “a wide degree of deference” when a prisoners’
speech is more concerned with causing insubordination, and especially
if it violates prison policy. 368 Yet, when the Fifth Circuit in Freeman
attempted to afford this wide degree of deference to a prisoners’
“insubordinate” speech, the court likely frustrated prison officials’
future efforts by protecting insubordinate speech that did not intend to
or actually incite a disturbance. 369
Second, while the Shaw Court criticized content-balancing tests
for supplanting the due deference courts owe to prison officials,370
cases like Connick demonstrate that the Pickering balance sufficiently
affords substantial deference to the government’s interests. 371 Connick
specifically created the categorical balancing in the public concern test
so that courts would completely defer to the employer’s interests when
the employee fails to speak on a matter of public concern. 372 Thus, a
rule requiring prisoners to speak on a matter of public-penological
concern before evaluating the legitimate penological interests involved
may prove more deferential than a rule solely examining the asserted
366

See id. at 392; discussion supra Parts II.A–B.
Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 151–52 (1983).
368
See id.; discussion supra Part I.
369
See Freeman v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 369 F.3d 854, 864 (5th Cir.
2004); supra note 224 and accompanying text.
370
Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229–30 (2001).
371
See discussion supra Part II.B.
372
Connick, 461 U.S. at 146–47.
367

214
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss1/6

56

Rose: Prisoners and Public Employees: Bridges to a New Future in Prison

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 5, Issue 1

Fall 2009

penological interests. 373 Moreover, courts sufficiently possess the
requisite expertise to appropriately balance the prison’s legitimate
interests against the prisoners’ free speech rights. 374 Not only is it the
role of courts to balance competing interests in adjudicating
constitutional claims, but courts routinely “adjudicate case fields alien
to them” without deferring to certain interests or claims like they
would in the Pickering balancing test. 375
Third, the legitimate penological interest tests may not provide
adequate deference to the government’s interests. Courts routinely
apply the indeterminate Pell test to afford little or no deference to
prison officials’ judgments, and they further create inflexible
categorical rules dictating proper prison administration. 376
Alternatively, because the Pickering balancing test depends on the
unique facts of the case, courts’ applications of the Pickering
balancing test would not inappropriately form inflexible categorical
rules dictating proper prison administration. 377
Hence, applying the public concern and Pickering balancing tests
to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims forms a practical rule that
would prove more feasible than applying the legitimate penological
interest tests to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims.

373

See id.; discussion supra Part V.B.
See Moss, supra note 18, at 1666–68. Moss noted that “judges do have a fair
bit of expertise in the criminal justice system, given both their extensive adjudication
of prisoner filings and the background a great many federal judges have as
prosecutors or otherwise as government officials in the executive or legislative
branch.” Id. at 1667. Moss further argued that “even if certain institutions are harder
for courts to analyze effectively, parties and courts are unlikely to accept erroneous
rulings easily, but instead will spend more time and resources remedying the
problem of imperfect information.” Id. at 1667–68.
375
See id. at 1666–67; discussion supra Part II.
376
See discussion supra Parts I.C, III.B–C, V.B.
377
See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S.
563, 569 (1968) (“Because of the enormous variety of fact situations . . . we do not
deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard
against which all such statements may be judged.”).
374
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2. The Public Concern and Pickering Balancing Tests Protect
Prisoners’ Most Important First Amendment Rights While
Ensuring that Prisoners Do Not Possess Potentially Broader
Free Speech Rights than Public Employees
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Bridges recognized that adopting
the legitimate penological interests tests not only protects speech on a
lower “rung [in] the hierarchy of First Amendment values,” but also
potentially affords prisoners with broader free speech rights than
public employees. 378 Conversely, applying the public concern and
Pickering balancing tests to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims
would protect prisoners’ important free speech rights, provide
definition to the Court’s amorphous prisoner free speech
jurisprudence, and ensure that prisoners do not absurdly possess
potentially greater free speech rights than public employees.
As demonstrated by the Court’s public employee free speech
jurisprudence, “the First Amendment’s primary aim is the full
protection of speech upon issues of public concern.” 379 The Court
specifically created and defined the free speech rights of public
employees to protect speech on a matter of public concern because of
(1) “the Constitution’s special concern with threats to the right of
citizens to participate in political affairs,” 380 and (2) “[t]he public’s
interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public
importance [remained] the core value of the Free Speech Clause.” 381
Lastly, “the [C]ourt has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public
issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values,’ and is entitled to special protection.” 382
Thus, if the First Amendment’s primary aim remained the full
protection of speech on matters of public concern, then the legitimate
378

See Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 551 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
379
Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (emphasis added).
380
Id. at 144–45 (emphasis added).
381
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573 (emphasis added).
382
Connick, 461 U.S. at 145 (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 467) (emphasis
added).
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penological interest tests’ failure to specially protect speech on matters
of public concern serves no real or important First Amendment
interests. 383 In fact, since the legitimate penological interests tests
“refused to recognize any hierarchy of values among important [free
speech] interests” by elevating any penological concern to “a higher
constitutional plane than [the prisoner’s free speech] rights,” they
protect practically worthless speech while failing to protect cherished
First Amendment values. 384 Tellingly, the legitimate penological
interest tests protects low-value speech about a prisoner’s missing
laundry in Jackson, but it may not protect the Pearson prisoner’s
critically important speech about prison officials coercing prisoners
into becoming prison informants. 385
Obviously, the Court developed the legitimate penological interest
tests because it wanted to accommodate the needs of prison officials,
and not because it wanted to protect valuable speech. 386 Thus, if the
public concern and Pickering balancing tests sufficiently
accommodate prison officials’ needs, then the tests should be preferred
because they also protect critically important speech at the heart of the
First Amendment’s self-government rationale.
Additionally, the fact that prisoners necessarily sacrifice some of
the rights and privileges that they normally possess as citizens does
not mean that the First Amendment should potentially afford no
protection to prisoners’ speech on matters of public concern. 387 Like
public employees, prisoners retain some rights as citizens to engage in
public debate; so, the First Amendment should specially protect their
speech on matters of public concern. 388 More importantly, the First
Amendment should especially protect prisoners’ speech on matters of
public concern because such speech critically informs “the public’s
383

See id.
See discussion supra Part I.C; supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
385
See Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1428 (5th Cir. 1989); Pearson v.
Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2006).
386
See discussion supra Part I.
387
See supra note 1 and accompanying text; discussion supra Parts II, V.C.2.
388
See supra note 1 and accompanying text; discussion supra Parts I, II, V.B.,
V.C.2.
384
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interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public
importance;” e.g., the operation of prison institutions. 389 Like public
employees, prisoners are “as a class, the members of a community
most likely to possess informed and definite opinions,” and share
critical facts and information about the operation of prison
institution. 390 Since prisons are typically isolated from the general
public, and because government’s power in operating prisons is at its
apex, the First Amendment should afford special protection to
prisoners’ speech on matters involving prison operations to inform the
public debate and serve as a check on governmental abuse of
power. 391 At the least, this proposition seems more sensible and in
accord with the First Amendment’s purposes than a test treating
prisoners as partners in proper prison administration. 392
Furthermore, the public concern and Pickering balancing tests
provide critical definition and protection to prisoners’ amorphous free
speech rights. The legitimate penological interests tests fail to identify
and assess any value to prisoners’ free speech rights as against the
government’s interests. 393 Consequently, courts possess little guidance
in identifying what free speech rights to protect—if any—and when to
actually protect those rights against legitimate governmental
restrictions. 394 Alternatively, the public concern and Pickering
balancing tests expressly inform courts to protect a prisoner’s speech
on a matter of public concern unless the government possesses greater
legitimate penological interests in restricting the prisoner’s speech. 395
Whether courts will actually protect prisoners’ speech on matters of
public-penological concern depends on the strength of the prison’s
legitimate penological objectives, to which courts give great deference

389

See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563,
573 (1968); MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 5.00.
390
See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.
391
See MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 5.00; discussion supra Part I.
392
See discussion supra Parts V.B, V.C.2.
393
See discussion supra Part I.C; supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
394
See discussion supra Part I.C.
395
See discussion supra Part II.
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under the Court’s prisoner free speech jurisprudence and similar
Pickering balancing factors. 396
Lastly, applying the public concern and Pickering balancing tests
to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims ensures that prisoners do
not posses potentially greater free speech rights than public
employees. While the Seventh Circuit accurately noted that “[a]
prisoner’s speech can be circumscribed in many ways that a public
employee’s speech cannot, and the two tests for assessing protected
speech account for those differences,” the legitimate penological
interests test may afford prisoners greater free speech rights than
public employees by not specifically subjecting prisoners’ speech to a
public concern requirement. 397 Thus, the court’s holding in Bridges
presents an absurd result. As the Sixth Circuit said, “[p]risoners
certainly do not have greater free speech rights than public
employees.” 398
The Seventh Circuit, however, justified this potentially absurd
result on the thoroughly discredited rationale that public employees
waived restrictions on their free speech rights by consenting to their
government employment. 399 The Court unequivocally rejected the
view that public employees waived their constitutional rights as a
condition of their employment. 400 If anything, “[t]he waiver argument
seems strongest as to prisoners.” 401 Arguably, prisoners waive their
rights by virtue of committing a crime or as a necessary incident of
their incarceration or punishment. 402
Concededly, a balancing test that ignores the requirement that
prisoners speak as citizens and further permits prisoners to speak on
matters of penological concern may give prisoners greater free speech
rights than public employees. It just seems absurd, however, that the
396

See discussion supra Parts I, II, V.C.1.
Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 550 (7th Cir. 2009); see also supra note 17
and accompanying text.
398
See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999); see also
supra note 194 and accompanying text.
399
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
400
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 149 and accompanying text.
401
Moss, supra note 17, at 1652.
402
Id. at 1652–53.
397
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First Amendment would not specially protect speech on a public
concern; and in so doing, potentially grant prisoners more freedom of
speech than trusted and invaluable public servants.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, applying the public concern and Pickering balancing
tests to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims would provide
definition and security to prisoners’ free speech rights, promote
important speech at the heart of the First Amendment, afford sufficient
deference to prison officials’ needs, and ensure that prisoners do not
possess potentially greater free speech rights than public employees.
The public concern and Pickering balancing tests offer a bridge to a
new First Amendment future in prisoners’ free speech retaliation
claims. That bridge provides definition and protection to the uncertain,
amorphous, and largely unprotected status of prisoners’ free speech
rights. That bridge also does not unduly interfere with prison officials’
pursuit of legitimate penological objectives or potentially protect vast
amounts of relatively worthless speech. That is the bridge the Seventh
Circuit should have built for evaluating prisoners’ free speech
retaliation claims.
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